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ABSTRACT
THE INSANITY DEFENSE, PUBLIC ANGER, AND THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND
PUNISHMENT
by
CHIOMA C. AJOKU
Adviser: Maureen O’Connor
Research indicates that the general public perceives the insanity defense negatively and inaccurately
despite the infrequency with which it is pled and the realities often surrounding those who plead the
defense. The negative and inaccurate perception of the insanity defense, combined with the potentially
increased punitive judgments the defense elicits, suggests that emotion may play a role in perception of
the insanity defense. In particular, the psychological literature on anger may contain answers to reactions
toward the insanity defense. The current research explored the role of anger on punitive judgments
toward a defendant pleading not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). Punitive judgment was assessed by
measuring participants’ perceptions of controllability (the extent to which the defendant’s actions were
perceived as preventable and controllable), punishment worthiness (the degree to which the
defendant’s actions were seen as intentional and perceptions of blameworthiness, punishmentworthiness, recklessness, and future recklessness), plea fairness, verdict fairness, verdict, and verdict
certainty. In both studies, mock jurors read case vignettes in which a defendant pled NGRI. In Study One,
potential jurors considered a plea and verdict of NGRI to be less fair than a plea and verdict of selfdefense. In Study Two, participants in the medication non-compliance group felt more anger, after
reading the vignettes, than participants in the prior history group. Additionally, anger was able to predict
verdict to a statistically significant degree. Overall, the current research suggests that anger does play a
role in negative perceptions of the insanity defense. Thus, it is important to further explore the role of
emotions in insanity defense bias and effective bias reduction tools and strategies.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The law is reason, free from passion
Aristotle
The law takes for granted that jurors are rational beings who weigh the reliability of all evidence
presented and render a verdict that is supported by fact, by legal instruction, and is free from prejudice
and emotional influence (Maroney, 2006). Yet, a substantial body of research calls this assumption into
question. One arena in which personal beliefs, attitudes, and biases may influence legal decision-making
is in insanity defense cases. Research suggests that the public is biased against the insanity defense. In
general, the literature indicates that the public believes a number of negative myths about the insanity
defense, holds a number of negative attitudes pertaining to the defense, does not adhere to insanity
defense standards or other jury instructions and, when serving as jurors or mock jurors, uses their own
biases against the insanity defense to decide cases (Hans, 1986; Ogloff, 1991; Skeem & Golding, 2001;
Whittemore & Ogloff, 1995). Though the insanity defense is used infrequently, it shines a particularly
vivid light on the question of whether jurors can put aside their emotions and uphold the principles of
law as written.
The insanity defense is an affirmative defense1 in which defendants assert that they should not
be held criminally liable for their actions because their actions were the result of a mental disease or
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An affirmative defense is one in which the defendant introduces evidence, which, if found to be credible, will negate
liability, even though the defendant has to concede that he committed the alleged acts. An affirmative defense can
either be a justification defense or an excuse defense (Robinson, 1982). A justification defense must involve an event
that authorizes a necessary and proportional act (on the part of the actor/defendant). The act is necessary if it is needed
to protect or further an interest in jeopardy. And the act is proportional if it is a rational reaction relative to the harm
threatened or the interest to be advanced (Robinson, 1982). In the legal system, justification means that the act in
question was justifiable, the defendant’s conduct permissible. It means that a defendant’s behavior is approved and the
consequences of their actions are seen as fair. An example of a justification defense would be self-defense (Robinson,
1982).
Article 35 of NY Penal Law states that: Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining
justifiable use of physical force, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal
when: 1. Such conduct is required or authorized by law or by a judicial decree, or is performed by a public servant in the
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defect (Nusbaum, 2002). Currently, all but four jurisdictions2 allow an insanity defense, and use some
variation of the American Law Institute (ALI) Standard or the M’Naghten Rule to determine insanity. The
ALI Standard states that a defendant may not be held criminally responsible for his or her actions if, “as a
result of a mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law” (ALI, 1962, § 4.01).3 The
M'Naghten Rule states that a person may not be held criminally responsible for his or her actions if, “at
the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason,
arising from a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if
he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong” (Regina v. M'Naghten, 1843).
According to the goals of the legal system, punishment is reserved for those who: 1) committed
the act in question (actus reus); and, 2) had the requisite “guilty mind” (mens rea) (Borum & Fulero,
reasonable exercise of his official powers, duties or functions; or 2. Such conduct is necessary as an emergency measure
to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed
through no fault of the actor, and which is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and
morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury
sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue. The necessity and justifiability of such conduct may
not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general
application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder. Whenever evidence relating
to the defense of justification under this subdivision is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law
whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense.
An excuse defense differs from a justification defense in that the actor is exempt from criminal liability because of a
quality/characteristic they possess as opposed to some quality or characteristic of the events that preceded the actor’s
actions (as would be the case in a justification defense). Insanity is classified as a justifying condition. Other justifying
conditions include intoxication, subnormality, or immaturity. The justifying condition may be short-term, long-term, or
permanent in nature. In addition, the condition must cause the act leading to the offense in question. In order to meet
criteria for an excuse defense at least one of four conditions must be met: (1) the act is not voluntary; (2) the actor does
not perceive the physical nature or consequences of their actions; (3) the actor does not know his actions are wrong or
criminal; or (4) the actor is unable to control his actions (Robinson, 1982).
Thus, justification is based on the quality of the act (or the situation) which justifies the defendant’s actions whereas
excuse is based on some quality in the defendant that frees them from liability due to the effect of that characteristic on
the defendant’s status or capacity.
2

Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas abolished the insanity defense. Nevada also abolished the defense but Nevada’s
Supreme Court later ruled the abolishment of the defense unconstitutional.
3

In general, the male pronoun will be used to discuss the insanity defendant.
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1999). The system has no interest in, and reaps no benefits from, punishing those who cannot exercise
free will. That is why the law does not punish those who lack the cognitive capacity to understand
and/or control their actions. Therefore, if an individual commits a crime as a direct result of mental
illness then that individual should not be punished and instead should receive rehabilitation in the form
of treatment (Silver, 1995). So, although a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict (NGRI) results in
confinement (to a mental health facility), the primary purpose of confinement is treatment (and safety)
as opposed to punishment.
Despite these goals, the public response to the insanity defense is often punitive and far from
compassionate. The insanity defense elicits a level of antagonism that is remarkable and
disproportionate, given that so few individuals actually plead insanity (Butler & Wasserman, 2006).
Silver, Cirincione, and Steadman (1994) found that the insanity defense is used less than 1% of the time
and is successful in only about 25% of those cases. Yet, despite the rarity of the plea, the defense, in
general, is perceived negatively and misconceptions about the defense are common.
For example, some core myths identified by the literature are: 1) the insanity defense is
overused; 2) use of the insanity defense is limited to murder cases/violent crimes; 3) there is no risk to
the defendant who pleads insanity; 4) NGRI acquittees are quickly released from custody; 5) NGRI
acquittees spend much less time in custody than do defendants convicted of the same offenses; 6)
criminal defendants who plead insanity are usually faking; 7) most insanity defense trials feature "battles
of the experts"; and 8) criminal defense attorneys employ the insanity defense plea solely to "beat the
rap (Perlin, 1995).
In addition, negative and inaccurate perceptions (such as the aforementioned ones) have been
shown to influence verdict selection (e.g., the selection of a guilty verdict versus an NGRI verdict) and
can be more predictive of verdict selection than manipulation of case facts or insanity defense standards
(Bailis, Darley, Waxman, & Robinson, 1995; Roberts & Golding, 1991; Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004).
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Thus, it seems, with regard to insanity cases, jurors’ verdicts may not be based on “reason free from
passion.” Such negative perceptions of the insanity defense are problematic because they inevitably
affect the ability of defendants to legitimately and effectively use the defense. If potential jurors are
hostile to a particular defense, then it may be impossible for individuals to have a fair trial, as guaranteed
by the 6th Amendment.
In general, the insanity literature has focused on myths related to bias, beliefs/attitudes related
to bias, and the impact of insanity defense standards/jury instructions on verdict selection. What has
received less attention, empirically, is why the insanity defense, in general, is subject to such bias. It is
important to try to understand what fuels bias because such an understanding affords the potential to
successfully combat bias in this area and ensure that the law is impartially applied.
Emotion research is one area that could potentially help explain the pervasiveness and
intractability of insanity bias. In particular, exploring the potential role of anger could be beneficial given
that research implicates anger in the elicitation of more punitive judgments (Forgas, 2001). Reviewing
the insanity literature4, one can see instances in which research findings about emotion could provide
missing links in current understanding. Research suggests that anger can influence trial outcomes. For
4

A review of public response to highly publicized controversial insanity cases, such as United States v. Hinckley, also
implicates anger in bias against the insanity defense. In 1982, when the Hinckley jury returned with a verdict of NGRI, for
a defendant who shot the President of the United States in plain view, the public was enraged. Experts diagnosed
Hinckley as either schizophrenic or psychotic and under the applicable standard at the time (ALI) the jury found Hinckley
NGRI. After the verdict, news outlets highlighted the general public’s outrage (Myers, 2009). Numerous articles contained
biting quotes about the trial. An ABC News poll taken the day after the verdict showed 83% of those polled thought
"justice was not done" in the Hinckley case. People blamed a legal system that they felt made it too easy for juries to find
defendants NGRI (http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hinckley/hinckleyaccount.html). One article stated,
"It's the system which found him innocent that's insane…a legal system that totally disregards the issue of guilt or
innocence and instead relies on so-called psychiatric experts to tell us whether a man who committed a deliberate attack
should be acquitted because he watched too many movies
(http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,925501-1,00.html)."
Of the reforms that took place between 1978 and 1990, the majority occurred after the verdict in the Hinckley trial.
Within a month of the verdict, House and Senate committees held hearings concerning the use of the insanity defense. In
the three years following the Hinckley verdict, Congress and half the states implemented limiting reforms to the defense.
Congress and nine states restricted/narrowed the scope of their respective insanity defense standards; Congress and
two-thirds of the states shifted the burden of proof to the defendant; eight states afforded jurors the use of the separate
and additional verdict choice of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI); and Utah abolished the defense (Linder, 2008; Neville,
2010).
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example, when individuals feel angry, they become more retaliation focused and more certain of their
cognitions. Individuals are also more likely to have their verdicts influenced by stereotypes/heuristics,
leading to a decrease in the use of systematic processing of information relevant to reaching a verdict
(Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).
Research on mental illness stigma also suggests that emotions such as fear and disgust could
play a role in insanity defense bias due to their impact on attributions of responsibility which lead to the
desire to punish and distance oneself from the object of fear and/or disgust (Corrigan, Markowitz,
Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 1980; Hinshaw & Stier, 2008; Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, & Pescosolido,
1999; Link, Yang, Phelan, & Collins, 2004; Thornicroft, Rose, Kassam, Sartorious, 2006). However, in order
to focus the scope of research and because of this paper’s particular interest in the role of anger on
attributions of responsibility and punishment, only the potential role of anger on insanity defense bias
will be explored at this time.
In order to highlight the possible role anger plays in public response to the insanity defense, this
paper first gives an overview of the insanity defense literature suggesting the defense is subject to bias.
Specifically, an overview of the myths related to bias and attitudes related to bias explores research
indicating that potential jurors perceive the defense negatively and hold beliefs that are unsympathetic
to the spirit of the defense. After reviewing the insanity literature, this paper reviews the anger literature
which focuses on the influence of anger on judgment and decision making with a particular focus on
anger’s effect on attributions of causality and responsibility. Finally, it synthesizes the potential role of
anger on judgment and decision-making in insanity cases.
Myths, Stereotypes, and Injustice
Perlin (1996) has stated that the insanity defendant is a chief object for societal anger because
the unpunished criminal challenges society’s conceptualizations of justice. According to Perlin (1996),
the public believes that good should be rewarded and criminal conduct must be punished. Perlin (1996)
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has theorized that if punishment is absent or uncertain, members of society feel that the entire
psychological and social structure on which morality relies is jeopardized. Additionally, when crimes are
punished individuals can let society handle retribution, channel its aggression, anger, and hostility,
project its “guilt, blame, shame, and fear,” and show the criminal that if members of society cannot
break the law, neither can the criminal (Perlin, 1996).
The insanity defense is problematic to members of society because individuals need to believe
that they are in control of their actions. Anything that suggests otherwise leads to distress. Mentally ill
individuals, particularly those who commit crimes and are not held criminally liable, challenge the idea
of free will. This is one potential explanation for why the public often feels that individuals are faking
their mental illness and/or are trying to evade punishment (Perlin, 1996; Roberts & Golding, 1991). Thus,
one potential explanation for why the insanity defense may trigger anger is because it offends
individual’s sense of justice and defies perceptions of free will.
Early research on the insanity defense offers credence to the idea that the defense triggers a
sense of injustice. Hans (1986) conducted an opinion survey to explore public perceptions of the insanity
defense. Participants in the study took part in a telephone survey assessing their level of agreement with
various statements about the insanity defense. The range of categories assessed were: 1) support for the
insanity defense; 2) attitudes about the insanity defense; and 3) knowledge about use of the insanity
plea. Additionally, Hans assessed participants’ social and political attitudes (Hans, 1986).
The results showed that approximately half the participants wanted the defense abolished. The
results of a factor analysis showed that respondents’ attitudes could be separated into five factors: 1)
punishment; 2) perceived danger (of having the insanity defense); 3) perceived injustice; 4) belief in
psychiatric treatment; and, 5) belief in effectiveness of procedures. About half the participants felt the
insane should be punished. With regard to perceived danger of having the defense, a majority of
participants saw the defense as a loophole and endorsed the statement that the defense sent criminals
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the message that they could get away with crime. The majority of participants also believed that the
defense allowed dangerous individuals to roam the streets. The majority also felt that psychiatrists
would say anything as a long as they were paid to say it. The “belief in psychiatric treatment” construct
involves beliefs that the insane deserve treatment, the insane should be treated rather than punished,
and that psychiatrists should testify in trials. A strong majority agreed with the aforementioned three
statements. However, at the same time, a majority of participants indicated that punishment does not
work on the insane and that judges and juries have a hard time telling whether someone is insane.
Hans (1986) theorized that negative attitudes about the insanity defense could be separated into
two broad categories: moral disapproval (retribution; reassertion of societal values and norms) and
utilitarian disapproval (behavioral control; deterrence & isolation of the offender). According to Hans
(1986), moral disapproval stems from the belief that insanity defendants are excused from retribution.
They make the public uncomfortable because they are deemed legally and morally excused from their
crimes. Individuals who feel moral disapproval could be characterized as those who feel that while
defendants are not “faking it” they perhaps should still be punished (Hans, 1986).
Utilitarian disapproval, on the other hand, stems from the belief that insanity defendants are
“faking it” and therefore the insanity defense provides defendants with a “loophole.” Additionally,
individuals who disapprove of the insanity defense for utilitarian reasons also feel that the defense does
not adequately contain defendants found NGRI from the public (Hans, 1986).
Hans (1986) also found that participants grossly overestimated use of the insanity plea. While
the plea is used successfully less than 1% of the time, participants believed the plea was used
successfully about 14% of the time. Participants also had misconceptions about the fate of NGRI
defendants, estimating that about half go to a mental health facility, a quarter are immediately set free,
leaving another quarter inexplicably unaccounted for. The study also found that while almost all
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participants supported treatment for the “insane,” nearly half simultaneously felt that the “insane”
should also be punished (Hans, 1986).
Insanity Defense Facts
In order to dispute the veracity of insanity myths, Silver, Cirincione, and Steadman (1994)
conducted a longitudinal study in eight states on the use, success, and outcomes of the insanity defense
compared to public perception. The results underscored the gap between insanity myths and reality
showing that the public overestimates: the amount of insanity pleas that involve a murder charge; the
rate the plea is used in felony cases; the rate of acquittal for defendants who use the plea; and
immediate release upon acquittal. On the other hand, the public underestimates: the extent of
hospitalization and the length of confinement in mental hospitals (Silver et al., 1994).
The study found that while the plea rate for insanity was only 0.9% the public perceived it as
37% (41 times greater than the reality). Additionally, while the success rate of the plea was only 26% the
public perceived it to be 44%. The public also believed that only 50.6% of defendants found NGRI are
hospitalized and that 25.6% of defendants found NGRI “go free.” The reality in those eight states was
that 84.7% of defendants found NGRI were hospitalized and only 15.3% of NGRI were immediately
released. If conditional release and outpatient treatment are taken into consideration (since the patient
is monitored by the hospital) then the reality is that 1.1% of defendants found NGRI are immediately
released as compared to the public perception of 25.6% (Silver et al., 1994).
Additionally, while the public believed that defendants found NGRI are confined 21.8 months,
confinement period lasts 32.5 months for defendants found NGRI who are not charged with murder and
76.4 months for those charged with murder. In fact, some research indicates that defendants found NGRI
are imprisoned longer than those convicted of the same offense (Silver et al., 1994).
The study also found that while 11% of all felony charges result in imprisonment, 67% of
unsuccessful insanity pleas result in imprisonment. This suggests that raising the insanity plea does
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indeed hold consequences and is not a “loophole.” Additionally, it also suggests that defendants who
unsuccessfully raise the plea are treated more “punitively” (Silver et al., 1994).
Silver (1995) also conducted a multi-state longitudinal survey study, using real world data to
explore the realities of the insanity defense. The results indicated that defendants found NGRI were less
likely to be released than those found guilty after raising an insanity plea. The results were mixed with
regard to time. In some states they spent less time in confinement and in other states they spent more
time. Even in states in which they spent less time, length of confinement was related to seriousness of
the offense (Silver, 1995). The results also showed that for all eight states, seriousness of offense was
more predictive of probability of release than mental disorder. In four of the states, offense was strongly
related to probability of release, whereas mental disorder was not significantly related (Silver, 1995). In
the other three states, mental disorder was a factor, although not as strong a factor as offense. Overall,
the more serious the offense the longer the length of confinement and, contrary to public sentiment,
successfully pleading insanity was not a ticket for quick release from custody (Silver, 1995).
Effect of Education, Standards, and Knowledge
Although Silver et al., (1994) and Silver (1995) were able to show that individuals’ beliefs about
the insanity defense are inaccurate, they could not be sure individuals’ beliefs would change if they were
presented with accurate information regarding the insanity defense.
Jeffrey and Pasewark (1983) explored the role of disconfirming data on public opinion. In their
study, they surveyed 75 community members and 150 undergraduates regarding their beliefs about the
insanity defense. The survey found that participants greatly overestimated the use of the insanity plea
and the rate of acquittal. In fact, 92% of participants endorsed the following statements, ‘‘*t+he insanity
plea is used too much.” Eighty-nine percent endorsed the statement, "too many people escape
responsibility for crimes by pleading insanity." In addition, participants believed that 38% of defendants
entered an insanity plea and 45% of defendants who pled insanity were acquitted.
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Even after actual statistics of the insanity defense were conveyed to participants (i.e., that only
0.8% of defendants in the state where the study was conducted pled insanity, and of these only 4% were
found legally insane), 52% of participants still agreed that the defense was abused and used too much.
The results of the study suggest that while some individuals’ beliefs are the result of misinformation and
can theoretically be corrected, others will continue to find the plea objectionable even when provided
with information about the defense’s low base rate. This suggests that beliefs about the insanity defense
may, at least in part, be perpetuated by an emotional component. In addition, since these beliefs are
negative and inaccurate, individuals who hold these beliefs view the defense through a biased lens.
Previous research (Hans, 1984; Jeffrey and Pasewark, 1983; Silver, Cirincione, & Steadman, 1994)
indicated that the public holds inaccurate perceptions about the disposition of individuals found NGRI.
Whittmore and Ogloff (1995) sought to further explore the impact of providing participants with
information about the disposition of those found NGRI on verdict selection. Whittmore and Ogloff
(1995) theorized that participants who did not receive dispositional information would be less likely to
render a NGRI verdict.
In their study, Whittmore and Ogloff (1995) had participants read one of two vignettes based on
actual trials. One trial was based on the Patten trial in which a female defendant with a history of bipolar
disorder heard voices from God that led her to take her hands off the steering wheel causing her to hit
and kill a pedestrian. The second trial was based on the Burkes trial in which a male defendant with no
history of mental illness killed his daughter and assaulted her boyfriend. After reading the vignette
assigned to them, participants were given the disposition for the defendant if found NGRI. The
dispositions were: indeterminate, will remain in "strict custody" for an undetermined period of time;
capped, will remain in custody for a determined period of time (roughly equivalent to the maximum
sentence available for the offense for which the accused was charged); and no disposition, no
information given about length of custody. Participants were also given information about mental state
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(psychotic, neurotic, and symptom free) of the defendant at the time of the trial. Participants then had
to render a verdict. The results showed that knowing what would happen to a defendant found NGRI did
not influence verdict selection. Furthermore, most participants knew that defendants found NGRI are
sent to a mental institution (Whittmore & Ogloff, 1995). These results suggest that accurate knowledge
about disposition may not factor into verdict selection.
In addition, the study found that most participants were not able to accurately recall the
defendant’s mental state at the time of the trial. Nevertheless, those who thought the defendant was
insane at the time of the trial were more likely to find the defendant NGRI (Whittmore & Ogloff, 1995).
These results have grave implications because mental state at the time of the trial is not a pertinent part
of insanity defense standards. Additionally, a number of irrelevant factors can play into a defendant’s
sanity or lack thereof at the time of the trial (e.g., medication). Thus, reliance on mental state at the time
of the trial can lead to flawed verdicts. Perhaps jurors mistakenly believe that if a defendant is insane at
the time of the trial it is more likely that they were insane at the time of the offense and therefore are
not “faking it.”
Byars and Galietta (2011) studied whether educational packets addressing myths, appreciation
(the extent to which a defendant has an appreciation of the wrongfulness and consequences of their
actions), or both could diminish bias based on post-test measures of insanity knowledge and attitudes.
In their study, undergraduate participants were given a full mock-trial transcript in which a defendant
pled NGRI under the ALI standard. After reading the transcript participants were given one of three
educational packets: a myth education packet; an appreciation education packet (which explained that
mental illness can in certain cases affect appreciation); and a combination packet. Participants were also
given pre and post-test measures of insanity defense beliefs: the Knowledge of Insanity Defense Scale
(KIDS) (Daftary-Kapur, Groscup, O’Connor, Coffaro, & Galietta, 2011) and the Attitudes toward the
Insanity Defense Scale (ATID) (Monier, Andersson, Daftary, & Groscup, 2008).
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The appreciation package did not, by itself, produce significant pre and post-test changes in
insanity defense knowledge. In contrast, the myth education materials did produce similar and
significant pre and post-test changes in insanity defense knowledge. This suggested that it was the myth
education component and not a combination of myth and appreciation education that caused changes
in insanity defense knowledge (Byars & Galietta, 2011). The results held, however, only for participants
without strong anti-insanity defense attitudes. The knowledge base of participants with strong antiinsanity defense attitudes was resistant to change. Thus, the study provides preliminary evidence that
misinformation across a number of myths can be combated with education if education is given to
individuals without strong anti-insanity defense attitudes. If the individual holds strong bias toward the
defense then education may not have a significant effect. This bolsters previous studies suggesting that
the defense is subject to bias. In addition, the resistance of some to education further indicates that
there may be an emotional component involved in insanity defense bias.
Attitudes Correlated with Anti-Insanity Bias
While individuals hold a number of change resistant inaccurate and negative beliefs about the
insanity defense that affect their attitude about the defense, they may also hold other attitudes that
influence perception of the defense.
Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan, and Thompson (1984) explored the potential link between deathqualified jurors (jurors who are not categorically opposed to the imposition of capital punishment),
attitudes toward the defense, and verdicts in insanity cases. Ellsworth et al., (1984) theorized that
attitudes toward the insanity defense had more to do with individuals’ opinion about criminals as
opposed to individuals’ opinions about the mentally ill. This would make sense for those opposed to the
insanity defense for the utilitarian reasons described by Hans (1986). Such individuals assume that those
who plead insanity are not actually “insane.” Ellsworth et al., (1984) also argued that those who believed
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in crime control also believed that individuals should be punished for their crimes regardless of their
mental health status.
In sum, Ellsworth et al., (1984) theorized that those who believed in crime control would be
more likely than those who were more due process oriented to convict a defendant pleading NGRI. In
their study, death-qualified, jury eligible adults and Witherspoon Excludable jury eligible adults (jurors
whose reservations about capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial decision as
to sentencing the defendant) were given summaries of four murder cases in which the insanity defense
was raised. In two vignettes, the defendants’ actions were the result of “organic illnesses” (i.e.,
intellectual disability and psychomotor epilepsy). In the other two vignettes, the defendants’ actions
were the result of “pure mental illness” (i.e., schizophrenia).5 The participants were then asked to render
verdicts of guilt or NGRI using the ALI standard. Participants were also asked to determine the
percentage of defendants who plead NGRI that are actually insane (as in not faking) and the reliability of
psychiatric testimony. Ellsworth et al. (1984), hypothesized that individuals concerned with crime control
would be more accepting of “organic illnesses” in insanity pleas but be suspicious of “pure mental
illness” in insanity pleas due to concerns about malingering.
The results demonstrated that excludable jurors (those whose opposition to the death penalty
would make it impossible for them to decide upon guilt fairly and impartially) had similar rates of NGRI
verdicts across all vignettes, while the NGRI rates for organic illness versus pure mental illness vignettes
differed significantly for death qualified jurors (the NGRI rates in organic cases were similar to those of
excludable jurors while the NGRI rates in pure mental illness cases was significantly lower) (Ellsworth et
al., 1984). The breakdown of verdicts was indicative of death qualified jurors’ negative bias against
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“Organic illness” and “pure mental illness” were the terms used by Ellsworth et al., (1984) in the study though
more recent work would not distinguish organic from mental since mental illnesses such as schizophrenia are
considered organic in nature.
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schizophrenic/mentally ill defendants, and not the insanity defense, because death qualified jurors gave
NGRI verdicts 50% of the time in organic cases, but only 10-20% in insanity cases involving schizophrenia.
When looking at their beliefs regarding the sanity of NGRI defendants, those whose opposition
to the death penalty would make it impossible for them to decide upon guilt fairly and impartially
believed that defendants were truly insane around 56% of the time whereas death qualified jurors
believed NGRI defendants were truly insane around 31% of the time. Ellsworth et al., (1984) interpreted
the results to suggest that death qualified jurors oppose the insanity defense because they do not
believe that those who avail themselves of the defense are truly insane.
Ellsworth et al., (1984) concluded that, “*t+o a person who believes strongly in crime control,
who believes that people must pay for their irresponsible behavior, it must be particularly galling to see
one form of irresponsibility excused by another (Ellsworth et al., 1984, pg. 90).” Therefore, individuals
are more forgiving of physical disorders because they are seen as outside of the person's control
whereas mental disorders are seen as “irresponsibility” or as weak or corrupted character (Ellsworth et
al., 1984).
Roberts and Golding (1991) also explored factors that jurors consider important in
determinations of criminal responsibility and insanity. Roberts and Golding (1991) studied the role of
delusional content, planfulness, and jury instructions by varying these elements and evaluating the
effect on attributional outcome. They also explored the role of social-moral perception and its role on
attributions of responsibility and then verdict selection. Finally, they measured attitudes toward the
insanity defense and punishment and the relationship to attributions of responsibility and verdict
selection.
To explore the aforementioned relationships, undergraduate and community participants read a
vignette which met DSM criteria for paranoid schizophrenia. In some vignettes, the delusion content was
manipulated so that the defendant was operating under a self-defense framework. In the other
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vignettes, the defendant was psychotic and paranoid but did not believe others were trying to kill him.
With regard to planfulness, in planful vignettes, the defendant shot the victim with a gun purchased
several days prior to the offense, called in sick to work the day of the offense, waited for the victim for
several hours, fled the scene of the crime, and was caught driving a getaway car several miles away. In
the non-planful condition, the victim was shot when he knocked at the defendant's door. The defendant
waited for the police and told them, "perhaps now this whole mess can get cleared up." After reading
the vignettes in which delusional content and planfulness were manipulated the participants had to
decide if the defendant was: 1) guilty or NGRI (ALI standard), or 2) guilty but mentally ill (GBMI), guilty, or
NGRI. The GMBI standard states that: A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense,
was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his
conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill.
NGRI verdicts were given 60% of the time in NGRI vs. guilty conditions, and only 35% in the NGRI
vs. guilty vs. GBMI condition. These results showed that the introduction of a GBMI verdict reduced NGRI
verdicts in a case in which the defendant was floridly psychotic and the psychosis was linked to the
crime. In other words, participants were favoring GBMI verdicts even in a case that might be considered
a prototypical insanity case. Additionally, individuals who chose GBMI endorsed more construals of
responsibility to the defendant. For example, they had increased perceptions that the defendant: was
mentally disordered, demonstrated appreciation of the wrongfulness of his act, was capable of acting
differently, had the capacity for logical reasoning, had the capacity to consider alternative courses of
action other than shooting the victim, had the capacity for rational behavior, had control over his beliefs,
and should be blamed and punished (Robert & Golding, 1991). The results suggest that GBMI verdicts
may have been given inappropriately because the GBMI verdict option reduced NGRI rates across the
board and not just in cases in which insanity related variables (planfulness or delusional content) were
manipulated.
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With regard to the attitudes/independent variables measured in the study, a step-wise
discriminant analysis revealed that the biggest predictor of verdict was Perceived Criminal Responsibility
(28% variance) (Robert & Golding, 1991). This was followed by Strict Liability (16%), Insanity Irrelevant to
Guilt (7%), Judicial Instructions (5%), Detention Concerns (5%), and Death Penalty Attitudes (1%) (Robert
& Golding, 1991).
In sum, the results of the study showed construals of responsibility and attitudes toward the
insanity defense were more predictive of verdict selection than jury instructions and manipulation of
case facts. In addition, the popularity of GBMI as a verdict choice perhaps betrays the desire of the
public to punish rather than treat the mentally ill.
Cutler, Moran, and Narby (1992) explored the relationship of particular attitudes to verdict.
Specifically, Cutler et al., (1992) theorized that individuals with negative attitudes towards psychiatrists
and the insanity defense would be less likely to give a verdict of NGRI. Participants in the study read a
vignette or saw a videotaped trial and then filled out a survey measuring case scenario and verdict; case
relevant attitudes; legal authoritarian attitudes; and demographics. Cutler et al., (1992) did not provide
participants with a legal definition of insanity or jury instructions.
Nearly 80% of the participants gave a guilty verdict and 18-22% of the participants voted NGRI.
Mock jurors high in legal authoritarianism were more likely to give a guilty verdict and to perceive the
psychiatrist as: less credible, less convincing, and less understandable. Participants high in
authoritarianism were more prone to perceive the defendant as: less likely to be insane, more likely to
have appreciated the nature and quality of his acts, more likely to have understood the difference
between right and wrong, more blameworthy, and more responsible. Finally, jurors high in
authoritarianism found the defense lawyer less skillful and felt that the insanity defense is less frequently
justified. In sum, legal authoritarian attitudes and attitudes toward psychiatrists were predictive of
verdict selection. The results are important because they show a correlation between an authoritarian
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belief system and elements of myth endorsement and both may have a role in a sense of injustice and
the activation of anger in insanity cases. Since the authors did not manipulate case facts the link
between legal authoritarian attitudes and attitudes toward psychiatrists and verdicts must be inferred.
Taking it one step further, Poulson, Brondino, Brown, and Braithwaite (1998) explored the
interrelationship between evidential factors, verdict, and attitudes. Poulson et al., (1998) theorized that
jurors’ attitudes influenced the way they perceived evidence, and this in turn affected verdict selection.
Specifically, Poulson et al., (1998) hypothesized that attitudes toward the insanity defense, due process
versus crime control, and the death penalty influenced perceptions of the defendant’s mental status,
belief in rehabilitation, and beliefs about the accuracy of expert testimony. All of this, in turn, influenced
pre-deliberation verdicts.
In this study (Poulson et al., 1998), participants listened to an audio tape and viewed slides of a
trial and then were asked to give a verdict of guilty, GBMI, NGRI, or not guilty. The study also measured:
attitude toward the insanity defense, attitude toward due process versus crime control, attitude toward
the death penalty, belief that the defendant could be rehabilitated, and beliefs regarding accuracy of
expert testimony. A path analysis tested the hypothesized relationships.
The final path model suggested that jurors’ attitudes toward the insanity defense and death
penalty affected perceptions of the defendant’s mental status and evaluation of expert testimony.
Perceptions of mental status and expert testimony then had a direct impact on verdict selection. Beliefs
about the benefit of treatment also had a small impact on verdict selection. Additionally, attitudes
toward the insanity defense, due process vs. crime control, and the death penalty had a negative
influence on beliefs that the defendant could benefit from psychological treatment (Poulson et al.,
1998).
The results of the study also indicated that participants who held favorable attitudes toward the
insanity defense believed the defendant’s mental status was an important factor in verdict selection.
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Those who did not hold favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense did not believe the defendant’s
mental state was an important factor in verdict selection (Poulson et al., 1998).
In sum, the study suggested that jurors’ attitudes toward punishment, crime control, and the
death penalty are important factors in verdict selection because they affect interpretation of evidential
factors. The defendant’s mental status (thinking, awareness, incapacity, etc.) was an important factor but
perception of mental status may be influenced by attitudes toward punishment, crime control, and the
death penalty (Poulson et al., 1998). For example, NGRI and GBMI-NGRI participants were more likely to
believe the defendant lacked capacity, had distorted thinking, and impaired awareness. Guilty and guiltyGBMI participants were more likely to believe the defendant had the capacity to control his behavior and
was able to think clearly.
Butler (2006) explored the relationship between support for the insanity defense and attitudes
toward insanity myths, the legal definitions of insanity, mental illness, and verdict selection using 300
venirepersons who had been called for jury duty (via a random selection of driver’s licenses and voter’s
registrations). Butler (2006) theorized that participants low in support for the defense would be more
likely to have negative attitudes toward mental illness; endorse insanity myths; be less receptive to legal
standards of insanity; and find the defendant guilty.
To test her theory, Butler (2006) had participants read the summary of testimony presented
during the first degree murder trial of a defendant pleading NGRI. Participants were then given jury
instructions and asked to select their verdict preference amongst guilty, not guilty, and NGRI. In addition,
participants’ support of the defense was measured by having participants circle the statement that they
agreed with most: (1) The insanity defense is never an appropriate defense for the crime of first-degree
murder; (2) In principle, I am opposed to the insanity defense, but I would consider it under certain
circumstances; (3) In principle, I favor the insanity defense, but I would not consider it under certain
circumstances; and (4) The insanity defense is always an appropriate defense for the crime of first-
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degree murder (Butler, 2006). In addition, Butler (2006) assessed participants’ attitudes toward the legal
standards of insanity; mental illness, and the myths associated with the insanity defense.
The study showed that, as hypothesized, participants high in support for the defense were more
likely to have positive attitudes toward mental illness; less likely to endorse insanity myths; more
receptive to legal standards of insanity; and less likely to find the defendant guilty (Butler, 2006). In
addition, level of support for the defense, age, educational level, occupation, type of prior jury service,
and political views affected verdict preference. However, Butler (2006) did not find a significant
relationship between participants’ experience with psychological disorders; participants’ exposure to
psychotropic medications; or participants’ experience with psychologists or psychiatrists and verdict
preference.
The aforementioned studies (Butler, 2006; Cutler et al., 1992; Ellsworth et al., 1984; Poulson et
al., 1998; Roberts & Golding, 1991) demonstrated that several attitudes influenced verdict selection.
Previous research had not, however, developed a scale that could easily identify whether potential jurors
held core attitudes related to bias against or attitudes toward the insanity defense itself. Skeem, Louden,
and Evans (2004) addressed this issue by developing the Insanity Defense Attitude Scale (IDA) that would
assess core elements of insanity defense attitudes, which could then predict verdict selection. After the
scale was constructed, validated, and refined (and renamed the Insanity Defense Attitude Scale-Revised
(IDAS-R)), the final version assessed attitudes on two dimensions: strict liability, or the extent to which
venirepersons believe that (a) mental illness reduces one’s capacity for rational decision-making and
control, and (b) reduced capacity is relevant to the issue of criminal responsibility; and injustice and
danger, which reflects the extent to which venirepersons believe the insanity defense is misused,
perhaps with the effect of jeopardizing public safety.
Thus, the IDAS-R reflects one’s views of the fundamental logic that underlies the insanity
defense and the extent to which one believes the insanity defense is dangerously abused. As noted by
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Hans (1986), these dimensions are loosely consistent with alternative goals of punishment. A strict
liability orientation is consistent with the principle of retribution: those who break the law ought to be
punished as “payback,” regardless of their degree of insanity. Similarly, concerns that the defense is
unjust and dangerous are consistent with utilitarian goals: dishonest and/or insane criminals must be
kept off the streets to control crime.
To test the scale’s predictive validity, participants were asked to read an insanity vignette,
indicate the likelihood (0–100%) that they would deem the defendant insane, render a categorical
verdict (guilty or insane) based on their own conceptions of insanity, and rate a set of case construal
items. The case construal items asked about participants’ perceptions of the defendant with respect to
nine dimensions (i.e., the extent to which the defendant was mentally disordered; appreciated that his
actions were wrong; was capable of perceiving alternatives, reasoning logically, acting differently,
behaving rationally; could help believing as he did; and should be blamed or punished) (Skeem et al.,
2004).
Finally participants were given several vignettes that matched the prototype identified by Skeem
and Golding (2001). The strength of association between IDAS-R scores and case judgments were highly
similar across manipulations of the defendant’s characteristics, suggesting that the moderate-strong
relation between IDAS-R and case judgments is not limited to particular constellations of case facts
(Skeem et al., 2004).
In terms of predictive utility, results of the study showed that of the IDAS-R factors, strict liability
(opinions that mental disorder implies reduced capacity or that defendants are responsible for their
crimes regardless of whether they are mentally disordered) is relatively strongly associated with case
judgments and injustice and danger (perceptions that the insanity defense is unjust and concerns about
the detention and dangerousness of insanity acquittees) is moderately so. Regardless of defendant
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characteristics, venirepersons with strong strict liability and punishment orientations are relatively likely
to vote guilty (Skeem et al., 2004).
Given the importance of insanity attitudes on verdict as shown by Skeem et al., (2004), Bloechl,
Vitacco, Neumann, and Erickson (2005) explored factors that might affect those attitudes. Participants
filled out demographic information and were asked to fill out the Insanity Defense Attitude Scale Revised
(IDAS-R) and the Attitude toward the Death Penalty Scale (ATDP). The results indicated that, in general,
participants held negative attitudes toward the insanity defense. Furthermore, positive attitudes toward
the death penalty and endorsement of the belief that the defense is overused (asked in the demographic
questionnaire) were the greatest predictors of negative attitudes toward the insanity defense.
Daftary-Kapur, Groscup, O’Connor, Coffaro, and Galietta (2011) furthered scale development by
developing a scale, Knowledge of Insanity Defense Scale, to measure knowledge about the defense as
opposed to attitudes toward the defense. The scale was based on the insanity defense myths identified
by Perlin (1995). To develop the scale, Daftary-Kapur et al., (2011) developed items that echoed each of
the eight insanity myths. The items were then administered to participants in multiple pre-testing
sessions to choose the items that would be included in the final scale based on their item-total
correlations, factor loadings, and validity. After the items were developed and assessed for reliability,
Daftary-Kapur et al., (2011) tested the scale’s validity by exploring the relationship of insanity defense
knowledge with verdict selection. The authors hypothesized that: (1) the scale would be related to
attitudes toward the insanity defense, such that those who have negative attitudes toward the insanity
defense will have lower levels of knowledge regarding its various aspects; (2) the scale would not be
related to legal authoritarianism because authoritarianism has been shown to be an anti-defendant
attitude and associated with control as opposed to due process concerns; (3) it would not be related to
knowledge of mental illness in general because such knowledge is not related to the insanity defense per
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se; and (4) that it would be predictive of insanity verdicts in a mock insanity case vignette (Daftary-Kapur
et al., 2011).
In the validation study, undergraduate participants read a case vignette and selected verdicts.
The data from a logistic regression showed that participants’ scores on the knowledge scale significantly
predicted their verdicts in an insanity defense case. In fact, the nine factors on the scale accounted for a
significant percent of the variance in verdict decision. Participants who believed that: the insanity
defense was more likely to be pled in cases that involved violent crimes; there was no risk to pleading
NGRI; those found NGRI are quickly released from custody; and that defendants who plead insanity are
usually faking, were more likely to find the defendant guilty than those who did not endorse the
aforementioned beliefs, or who believed them to a lesser degree (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2011).
Summary
Literature suggests the public believes a number of core negative myths about the insanity
defense. These negative myths play a role in verdict selection in insanity cases. Additionally, certain
attitudes have been implicated in myth endorsement and insanity defense bias. For example, studies
have linked attitudes about crime control, due process, the death penalty, utilitarianism, and
authoritarianism to negative beliefs about the insanity defense and myth endorsement. Additionally,
studies suggest that jurors respond to the insanity defense in ways that are punitive in nature. Given the
findings of insanity defense literature (e.g., that even in the face of disconfirming evidence jurors still
persist in believing insanity myths and that attitudes are more predictive of verdict than manipulation of
case facts, jury instructions, and legal standards) it seems plausible that emotions play a role in insanity
defense bias and verdict selection. Anger, in particular, is one emotion that may be implicated because
anger influences judgment and decision-making by biasing response tendencies integral to the formation
of judgments and the rendering of decisions. Ultimately, anger’s influence on judgment and decision-
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making leads individuals to feel more certain and to take action steps that are often retaliatory in nature
(Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).
Some of the information in the insanity defense literature potentially suggests that individuals,
when regarding insanity cases, might feel an injustice has occurred and might be acting in a
punitive/retaliatory manner as a result of biased response tendencies (e.g., statements made by the
public, particularly in cases with sympathetic victims). For example, the content and persistence of
insanity defense myths despite disconfirming evidence and attitudes related to insanity bias are
potentially related to a sense of injustice.
The insanity defense literature identifies eight core insanity myths. To varying degrees, belief in
any of the eight myths could lead an individual confronted with a defendant raising an insanity defense
to feel an injustice had occurred (the crime committed) and that an individual had done something they
should not have done. The injustice potentially has many levels. On one level, the injustice can be the
offense itself. By pleading not guilty by reason of insanity (unlike a defendant that pleads not guilty) a
defendant essentially says, “I am the party responsible for the acts that occurred but I should not be held
legally or morally responsible.” On another level, the injustice is that not only has a defendant
committed a transgression but they also escape punishment.
To begin to better understand these strong reactions to the insanity defense, this paper will
explore the potential influence of anger on insanity judgments. It will first critically analyze the literature
on the influence of anger on certain aspects of judgment and decision-making, and then apply those
insights to explanations about the possible role of anger on insanity verdicts/attitudes.
Anger
Anybody can become angry-that is easy; but to be angry with the right person, and to the right degree,
and at the right time, and for the right purpose, and then in the right way-that is not easy.
-Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
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The literature on the impact of anger on decision-making as it pertains to juror decision-making
is limited. A number of promising findings suggest, however, that this area may have the potential to
contribute significantly to the understanding of juror behavior generally and insanity defense cases in
particular. This section will begin by defining “anger” as it will be used in this analysis and will follow with
a review of the available literature on the influence of anger on judgment and decision-making.
Anger is considered a basic emotion that is negative, varies in strength and duration, and is
linked to emotional arousal and a perception of being wronged by another (Carver & Harmon-Jones,
2009; Kassinove & Sukhodolsky, 1995). This is often followed by a strong desire to undo said harm
(Averill, 1982). Anger is thought to consist of several aspects: physiological (general sympathetic arousal,
hormone/neurotransmitter function), cognitive (irrational beliefs, automatic thoughts, inciting images),
phenomenological (subjective alertness and classification of angry moods), and behavioral (facial
expressions, acting out of anger verbally/behaviorally) (Berkowitz, 1993; Deffenbacher, 1994; Eckhardt
& Deffenbacher, 1995; Kassinove & Sukhodolsky, 1995).
Anger is associated with threat identification and is a component in a number of psychological
disorders. Anger appears in combination with delusions and command hallucinations in psychotic
disorders, emotional instability present in personality disorders, irritability and “attacks” in mood
disorders, impulse control disorders, intellectual impairments, and dementia (Deffenbacher, 2011).
When anger plays a role in a particular mental illness, it is the dysregulation of anger that is
problematic, the activation, expression, and experience sans proper controls. Thus, it is not anger itself
that is intrinsically an issue but the intensity, frequency, and behavioral effects that can result in harm
and distress. From a clinical perspective, anger is harmful, in part, because it can cause functional
impairment in a number of domains negatively affecting careful deliberation, important relationships,
work performance, and physical health. Anger has been linked to numerous types of aggressive behavior
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such as spousal abuse, child abuse, road rage, murder, and is linked to myriad maladaptive behaviors
that usually result in negative psychosocial and interpersonal consequences (Deffenbacher, 2011).
Although related and often linked, the clinical literature makes a distinction between the
constructs of anger, hostility, and aggression (Spielberger, Reheiser, & Sydeman, 1995). In general, anger
is the emotion; hostility is the attitude, and aggression is the behavior. Thus, anger is not conceptualized
as a behavior or personality trait (Edmondson & Conger, 1996). Hostility is considered a persistent
aggressive attitude that causes a person to engage in aggressive behavior (Boyle & Vivian, 1996;
Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983).
Those high in anger experience greater levels of anger in a variety of situations. In addition,
those high in anger often attempt to stifle their anger or they express their anger in negative and
problematic ways. They may have poor coping skills and likely handle stress in maladaptive ways. They
have lower self-esteem than those with less anger, and are at an increased risk for drug and alcohol
abuse. Furthermore, those who experience greater levels of anger show bias in how they assess and
judge events leading them to blame others for bad outcomes and view the behavior of others (in such
situations) as deliberate (Hazebroek, Howells, & Day, 2001).
Anger is the result of: (a) one or more triggering events, (b) an individual’s pre-anger state
(involving both temporary states and enduring ways of cognitively interpreting situations), and (c)
appraisals of the trigger and coping resources (i.e., primary and secondary appraisal) (Lazarus, 1991).
There are three types of triggering events. The first is explicit, identifiable external events.
Examples of identifiable external events are exasperating or provoking events, the actions of others,
objects, and one’s own behaviors or characteristics. These events share several elements. In such
situations, an individual will identify the anger provoking agent. And the angry individual will usually
ascribe a cause and effect relationship between the external event and their anger (e.g., “their behavior
made me angry”). In addition, to the individual experiencing anger, their level of anger always seems
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proportional to the triggering event. Sometimes, anger is triggered not only by external events but also
by anger-causing memories and images. This means that sometimes a situation causes an individual to
feel angry and it activates anger-related memories that increase the level of anger an individual
experiences as a result of the current event. It is often not easy to name the source of anger and the
anger in such cases does not seem proportionate to the identified trigger (Deffenbacher, 2011).
In addition to external stimuli, anger can be triggered by internal stimuli that can be cognitive
and/or emotional. In these cases, anger can be triggered by ruminating or brooding about past
maltreatment, injustice, or abuse. As rumination increases so does the level of anger. This increases the
individual’s sense of being out of control and results in a higher chance of a maladaptive reaction
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). In addition to rumination and brooding, anger can also be triggered by other
emotions like rejection, hurt, embarrassment, or humiliation. The key to understanding anger in such
cases is to identify the emotions and/or cognitions that triggered the anger (Deffenbacher, 2011).
Anger can also be strongly impacted by one’s pre-anger state, by for example, temporary and
long-lasting characteristics that the individual possesses when the triggering event occurs. The
likelihood, strength, and direction of anger are affected by the individual’s current emotionalphysiological state. If a person is in a good mood when a triggering event happens anger may not be
elicited or it may be mild. If an individual is in an angry mood, this can increase the chances of an angry
response even if the triggering event is unrelated to the cause of their prior angry mood (Deffenbacher,
2011; Zillman, 1971).
Anger is also affected by the way an individual sees the world (Deffenbacher & McKay, 2000;
Kassinove & Tafrate, 2002). For example, anger often results when an individual feels that another has
encroached on their province (Beck, 1976) and infringed on an individual’s beliefs, code of conduct, and
standards of living (Dryden, 1990). Anger also results when an individual feels something important to
their view of themselves is being criticized or when something/someone interferes with an individual’s
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goal (Lazarus, 1991). When one’s world view is flexible and the result of personal preference, anger
tends to be mild to moderate when this view is challenged. However, if one’s worldview is inflexible and
overly inclusive this results in greater levels of anger and more aggressive behavior (Deffenbacher,
2011).
Appraisal is the third factor in anger. When a trigger occurs it is appraised based on the context
in which the angering event occurs and based on the individual’s pre-anger state (Deffenbacher, 2011;
Deffenbacher & McKay, 2000; Kassinove & Tafrate, 2002). Primary appraisals are aimed at the triggering
event and the nature of that situation. For example, if a triggering event is seen as a breach of standards
and norms, an intrusion on one's domain, an attack on one's self image, and/or an unjustifiable
obstruction of one’s goals then this will lead to strong anger and potentially lead to aggressive behavior.
This occurs, because the angry individual has come to the conclusion that something did occur or could
occur that should not. The likelihood and degree of anger are greater if events are also appraised as: “(a)
intentional (i.e., someone did it on purpose vs. it was accidental or just in the natural course of things),
(b) preventable or controllable (i.e., the event could have been and therefore should have been
controlled vs. it was accidental or just a benign outcome of events), (c) unwarranted (i.e., unjust, unfair,
and/or undeserved vs. fair, deserved, and/or happenstance), and (d) blameworthy (i.e., someone or
something is not only responsible but deserves pain, punishment, and suffering vs. an accurate appraisal
of responsibility, but without the need for punishment)” (Deffenbacher, 2011).
In addition, a triggering event is more likely to elicit anger if the event is attributed to an
“enemy,” outsider, or member of an out-group. In such cases, anger is greater because an individual is
set off by the situation and the other person’s association with a negative group or label. Anger is also
greater when the individual sees triggering events as having more importance or negative consequences
than it does in reality, sees situations in extremely divided, negative lights (i.e. dichotomous thinking),
ascribes malicious purpose to the identified source of anger (i.e. hostile attributional bias), and/or
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entertains images and ideas of retribution (Deffenbacher, 2011; Deffenbacher & McKay, 2000;
Kassinove & Tafrate, 2002, 2006).
Thus, emotion literature indicates that anger can influence judgment and decision-making
because of its impact on appraisals of causality and responsibility for triggering events (Deffenbacher,
2011; Hazebroek, Howells, & Day, 2001; Lazarus, 1991; Lerner & Keltner, 2001).
Relationship between Anger and Attributions
One way anger is thought to affect judgment and decision-making is through its influence on
attributions of causality and responsibility. Researchers have theorized that anger affects attributions in
ways that differ from the impact of other negatively valenced emotions such as fear and sadness, and
thus have explored such potential differences. Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) tested whether
anger influences attributions of causality and responsibility by increasing the likelihood of predicting
both dispositional attributions for future events and dispositional attributions made for ambiguous
events.
To test this hypothesis, Keltner et al., (1993) conducted two studies in which emotion was
induced by giving participants either an anger scenario or a sadness scenario to read. In the sadness
scenario, participants imagined the death of their mother, who died as a result of unforeseen and
inexplicable reasons. In the anger scenario, participants imagined receiving an extremely low grade from
an unfair and unreasonable teaching assistant.
In Study One, participants gave estimates of the likelihood of future events. In Study Two,
participants read a scenario of a situation and were then asked to rate: the causes of the target situation
(human factors/human agency vs. situational factors/situational agency), its hopelessness (the extent to
which anything could be done to improve the situation), the fairness of others' actions, and the
emotions the situation would induce (would they feel sadness, anger, guilt, contempt, happiness, and
pride) (Keltner et al., 1993). The results of the study showed that in the induced anger condition,
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participants perceived that future events were more likely to be caused by the person. Sadness had the
opposite effect.
In Studies 3-5, Keltner et al., (1993) manipulated the salience of either experienced emotion or
attributional content (explicit agency information) in order to tease apart the role of emotion versus
cognition in differences seen in attributional judgments. For example, Experiment 3, a replication of
Experiment 1, added two emotionally neutral conditions in which appraisals of human or situational
agency were made salient by repeatedly attributing relatively non-emotional events to human or
situational agency (e.g., getting a good grade on a test due to luck or studying depending on the
condition) (Keltner et al., 1993). In Experiment 4, the opposite approach was employed. Emotions were
made salient, but not appraisals. In Experiment 4, sadness and anger were induced without mentioning
agency. In order to accomplish this, participants were asked to make sad or angry expressions. In
Experiment 5, the intensity of participants’ emotional response to the recollection of a past sad or angry
event was varied by using a technique suggested by Strack, Schwarz, and Gschneidinger (1985), which
found that participants became emotional when asked how a past emotional experience occurred, but
did not become emotional when asked why such an event occurred (Keltner et al., 1993).
The results of Experiment 3 showed that the salient appraisals of situational and human agency
in the non-emotional story had no significant effect on likelihood estimates, while the effects of the
emotional stories were significant, mirroring the results of Experiment 1. Experiment 4 found that
sadness and anger influenced appraisals of human versus situational causes of future negative events
even when the emotions were induced without mention of the relevant appraisals, and without
suggesting an actual experience that might call these appraisals to mind (Keltner et al., 1993). Finally, the
results of Experiment 5 suggested that sad subjects saw negative events and general life circumstances
as more the result of situational factors. Angry subjects saw the same events as caused by human
agency. In sum, the results showed that emotion and not cognition (explicit agency information)
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increased the likelihood that individuals would attribute human agency to negative future events
(Keltner et al., 1993).
Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock (1999) expanded the work of Keltner et al., (1993) by exploring the
specific circumstances under which experimentally primed anger would impact attributions of
responsibility and punishment for future unrelated events. In their study, undergraduate participants
viewed scenarios in which harm caused (a video of a man beating up a helpless teenager) varied with
regard to justice served (punished, unpunished, justice-ambiguous/no information given). In the control
condition, participants did not see the video and therefore were not emotionally primed. Participants
were then given a vignette to read regarding acts of negligence and recklessness and were then asked,
on a 1-7 scale: how intentional the defendant's actions were; to what extent the defendant should be
blamed; to what extent the defendant should be punished; how much money, if any, should be paid to
the victim; how reckless the defendant seemed to be; and how reckless the defendant might be in future
situations. Participants were also asked how much personal control the defendant had, and how
mitigating circumstances might affect their assignment of blame.
Contrary to the findings of Keltner et al., (1993), anger did not uniformly lead to blame and
punishment. The results showed that anger resulted in increasingly punitive judgments of wrongdoers
(the defendants in the vignettes) only in combination with an injustice belief. However, when the
wrongdoer was punished, or when no information on justice was given, anger did not result in
increasingly punitive judgments. Furthermore, this occurred even though all participants experienced
the same level of anger after viewing the crime-video. In addition, those participants who were explicitly
told that justice had been served, or who received no justice information, took into consideration the
defendants' intentions in determining the right level of punishment. However, for participants who
believed that an injustice had occurred, the connection between intention and punishment was
mediated by anger, and intention no longer predicted punishment.
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In sum, the results of the study indicate that anger elicited more punitive attributional heuristics
for inferring responsibility of harm when the original cause of the person’s anger was unpunished.
According to Goldberg et al., when individuals are angry and feel that justice has not been served they
become “intuitive prosecutors” who are angered by and desire to punish wrongdoers. Intuitive
prosecutors become angered by a norm violation/transgression thereby becoming more likely to see
future transgressions as deserving of punishment. Since intuitive prosecutors feel that justice has been
eluded, they do not see the need for engagement in attributional searches of alternative explanations or
perpetrators. The barrier for believing an injustice has occurred is therefore lowered. Thus, the focus
turns from evaluating the situation (with regard to responsibility, etc.) to being in a punishment mind
frame in order to impede future norm violations (Goldberg et al., 1999).
Using a similar design, Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock (1998) explored the relationship of
accountability, authoritarianism, and anger on attributions of responsibility. In their study,
undergraduate participants were primed to feel anger, by watching a video in which a bully beat up a
helpless teenager, or were primed for a neutral emotion. In the anger with injustice condition the bully is
charged but found not guilty due to a technicality. In the anger with justice condition the bully served a
substantial amount of time in jail. Some participants were told their responses to the priming video
would either be public (accountable) or private (unaccountable). Participants filled out measures of
authoritarianism. Finally, participants had to make attributions of responsibility and punishment with
regard to four vignettes with increasing degrees of intent and harm.
The results showed that when participants were primed to feel anger they were more likely to
make punitive attributions of responsibility. While differences were found between the justice and
injustice paradigms, the degree of punitive attributes was influenced by individual personality traits. In
particular, the study found that amongst individuals who were primed to feel angry those who were
higher on authoritarianism were even more punitive (Lerner et al., 1998). It is important to note that
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while individuals high in authoritarianism were more likely than those low in authoritarianism to be
punitive they were no more likely to be influenced by incidental anger. In other words, such individuals
were not more sensitive to the anger inducing video that showed a clear norm violation. Additionally, as
suggested by other studies, anger led to the use of simple heuristic cues. For example, angry participants
attributed equivalent levels of responsibility and punishment to the four actors in the vignettes despite
the differing levels of intent and harm caused (Lerner et al., 1998).
Another important finding of the study is that individuals were less punitive when they believed
they would have to account for their judgments. This suggests that individuals will be more thoughtful
and reflective when they are made accountable for their judgments. The study found that accountability
tamed punitive judgments regardless of when individuals are told they will be held accountable (before
or after anger priming). In addition, accountability tapered punitive judgments even for participants who
experienced the most anger (Lerner et al., 1998).
Based on the work of Lerner, Vidmar (2001) developed a six-stage model to explain the
phenomenon of retribution. Vidmar’s retribution model posits that: “(1) there is a perceived rule or
norm violation; (2) the rule violator’s intention is perceived as blameworthy; (3) the combination of (1)
and (2) threatens or actually harms values related to the perceiver’s personal self, status, or internalized
group values; (4) the emotion of anger is aroused; (5) the cognitions and emotions foster reactions
against the violator; (6) during or following punishment the anger dissipates, cognitions return toward
homeostasis, and the rule or norm is perceived to be vindicated (Vidmar, 2001, pgs. 2-3).” The desire for
retribution, at least in laboratory studies, also seems to dissipate in the face of an excuse or mitigating
condition (Vidmar, 2001). However, excuses and mitigating conditions do not always seem to have the
same ameliorating effects in field research, at least where the insanity defense is concerned. When
looking at insanity cases, results from field studies suggest that community members do not perceive
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insanity as a legitimate defense and that community member see the defendant as responsible and
worthy of punishment (Vidmar, 2001).
Anger and the Insanity Defense
Overall, the literature on anger indicates that anger is elicited when individuals feel an injustice
has occurred. One way the experience of anger influences judgment and decision-making is by biasing
attributions of causality and responsibility. Ultimately, anger’s influence on judgment and decisionmaking leads individuals to take action steps that are often retaliatory in nature (Lerner, Goldberg, &
Tetlock, 1998; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).
Applying these findings to what is known about insanity defense judgments suggests that
individuals might feel an injustice has occurred and might be acting in a punitive/retaliatory manner as a
result of biased response tendencies (e.g., statements made by the public, particularly in cases with
sympathetic victims). For example, the content and persistence of insanity defense myths despite
disconfirming evidence and attitudes related to insanity bias are potentially related to a sense of
injustice.
The insanity defense literature identifies eight core insanity myths. To varying degrees, belief in
any of the eight myths could lead an individual confronted with a defendant raising an insanity defense
to feel an injustice had occurred (the crime committed) and that an individual had done something they
should not have done. The injustice potentially has many levels. On one level, the injustice can be the
offense itself. By pleading not guilty by reason of insanity (unlike a defendant that pleads not guilty) a
defendant essentially says, “I am the party responsible for the acts that occurred but I should not be held
legally or morally responsible.” On another level, the injustice is that not only has a defendant
committed a transgression but they also escape punishment. As the research indicates these feelings of
anger would then make potential jurors more retaliation focused and more certain of their cognitions.
Jurors would also be more likely to have their verdicts influenced by stereotypes/heuristics, leading to a
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decrease in the use of systematic processing of information relevant to reaching a verdict (Lerner,
Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).
Although anger was not explicitly measured, a number of the insanity defense studies previously
reviewed indicate that jurors exhibit response tendencies demonstrated by angry individuals. For
example, studies such as the one conducted by Jeffrey and Pasewark (1984) and Whittmore and Ogloff
(1995), show that many jurors remain certain of their cognitions even in the face of disconfirming
information. Since anger promotes certainty (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), individuals’ certainty that the
insanity defense promotes injustice that needs to be rectified would interfere with an individual’s ability
to process and retain myth disconfirming facts about the insanity defense.
In addition to certainty bias, the anger literature also suggests that anger can cause bias in
attributions of causality and responsibility. Namely, anger causes individuals to see others as more
responsible and in control of their actions (Goldberg et al., 1999; Keltner et al., 1993). Therefore, despite
the fact that the public is told that mental illness can impair a person’s ability to understand or control
their actions, anger could cloud the public’s ability to “buy” such an argument because angry individuals
see others as more responsible for and in control of their actions. Thus, it seems quite possible that
anger is involved in insanity defense bias and therefore affects juror decision-making in such cases.
The insanity defense exists because a major tenet of the American legal system is the belief that
individuals with mental illness, who, as a result of that illness do not meet the legal standard for
culpability, deserve treatment as opposed to punishment. On one hand, it would seem that potential
jurors intellectually understand or accept the rationale behind the insanity defense, hence the support
for treatment that has been measured by insanity defense research. On the other hand, emotionally,
potential jurors are angered and repelled by people who are deemed to be “insane” or by the offenses
committed by those people and therefore desire to punish those who plead NGRI. Such reactions go
against the spirit of the law. If the insanity defense elicits anger in jurors and anger affects judgment and
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decision making in a way that causes jurors to see insanity defendants as more blameworthy, less
trustworthy, and more deserving of punishment, then it would be difficult for a defendant pleading NGRI
to get a fair trial per their 6th amendment right. Not only would it be difficult to get a fair trial but if anger
is clouding judgment and decision-making, the law in insanity cases becomes unpredictable. If jurors are
not using given legal standards to determine cases, variability ensues which results in miscarriages of
justice that are unacceptable based on the reality of the insanity defense and the goals of the legal
system.
Comparing the insanity and anger literature suggests that affect, specifically anger, could be
driving insanity defense bias. Exploring the link between anger and insanity defense bias is important
because a wealth of information exists not only about why anger exists but also regarding mechanisms
of anger. Additionally, if anger is driving insanity bias then it may be important to focus research on
potential ways to curb or lessen the effect of anger on response tendencies critical to judgment and
decision making.
The law may not, in other words, be free from passion. The research suggests that individuals
use their emotional states as informational cues. When asked to come to a judgment the individual will
be guided by their current emotional state. As a result, how they feel subsequently becomes a
barometer for how they feel about the thing to be evaluated and what type of judgment is warranted
(Forgas, 2001). If jurors feel anger when dealing with the insanity defense this will lead to more punitive
sentences.
Therefore, contrary to public belief, using the defense is a gamble. In fact, research suggests that
an unsuccessful insanity plea often leads to harsher punishments than not using the defense at all. All of
this presents a problem for individuals with mental illness who should be able to effectively use the
defense and for defense attorneys trying to properly represent their clients. NGRI is an appropriate
verdict for those who lack the requisite mens rea but defendants who the meet standards necessary for
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an NGRI verdict may not get such a verdict. Exploring and understanding the role of anger will help direct
possible anger targeted remedies and solutions that may change perceptions of the insanity defense or
at the very least (and perhaps more realistically) stop jurors from accessing biases and bring jurors in
greater accordance with the spirit of insanity defense law.
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Chapter 2: Study One Methods
Overall Design
The literature suggests that anger may mediate the link between the use of an insanity defense
and subsequent punitive judgments. Thus, it is possible that the degree of anger experienced by jurors
(when presented with an insanity case) explains the degree to which an individual will be punitive
toward a defendant pleading insanity. Consequently, if a defendant pleads insanity and jurors
experience anger as result of the plea, then the jurors will be more punitive in their judgments.
This dissertation was designed to investigate the relationship between anger and the insanity
defense using vignettes based on a hypothetical murder case. Study One, investigated whether
participants would react more punitively, and with more anger, when a defendant pleads insanity versus
self-defense, in a case that could support either verdict. Trait and state anger, as well as overall
emotional arousal, were measured in addition to attitudes toward the legal defenses themselves. Study
Two (discussed in detail in Chapter 4), which focused only on a defendant who pleads insanity,
investigated which features of the case facts might produce a higher anger response – either the
defendant’s own failure to take prescribed medication or a prior history between the defendant and the
victim. Prior research findings suggest that certain case facts, such as the two explored in Study Two,
play into public concerns regarding moral blameworthiness (medication non-compliance potentially
raises issues of preventability and prior history potentially raises issues of planfulness). Taken together,
the two studies explored not only the role of pleading insanity on punitive judgments and anger but also
the role of specific case facts, in insanity cases, on punitive judgments and anger. This chapter, details
the methodology of Study One.
The hypotheses for Study One were that:
1) An insanity plea would increase punitive judgments as compared to a plea of self-defense;
2) An insanity plea would increase anger as compared to a plea of self-defense; and,
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3) Increases in anger would lead to increases in punitive judgment.
If the results supported all three hypotheses, for Study One, then the results would indicate that anger
mediates the relationship between plea and punitive judgments. A mediation model, presented in
Figure 1, shows the hypothesized relationships (see Figure A1).
Participants
There were 379 participants in the study, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk). The
use of Mturk was employed because it allowed for the effective recruitment of a large number of
participants for a nominal amount. Additionally, Mturk participants in the U.S. are more representative
of the U.S. population than college students. Furthermore, in general, they are motivated to successfully
complete “HITS” because their Mturk “reputation”/rating depends on successful completion/payment
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Of the 379 participants, 155 were male and 225 were female
(59.4%). For participant ethnicity, 9.8% were African American, 8% were Native American, 6.1% were
Asian, 0.3% were Pacific Islander, 2.1% were biracial, 75.7 were Caucasian, 4.5% were Hispanic, and
0.8% identified as other. Participants were of legal age to consent to participate in a research project. In
addition, participants were jury eligible. Thus, participants were those who reported they were: United
States citizens, at least 18 years of age, not currently subject to felony charges, and never convicted of a
felony. Participants were paid 25 cents for their participation. The average age for participants was 35.3
(SD = 12.8).
Materials
Case Vignettes. Participants were randomly assigned to read a summary of a homicide case in
which: a) the plea was not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI); b) the plea was not guilty by reason of
self-defense; or, c) no information about plea was given. Information about plea was followed by two
brief paragraphs containing details of the case (See Appendix B). The vignettes provided brief
background information about the victim’s actions prior to his death (such as the fact that he was
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hanging out with a friend and then decided to go to the grocery store alone); and, information that
aided the police in the arrest of the defendant in the vignette (e.g., the defendant’s fingerprints were
found on the murder weapon). The last paragraph contained brief testimony from the defendant
regarding his version of events as well as information potentially relevant to his mental state at the time
of the alleged offense (i.e. the defendant had felt threatened by the victim and felt that he might need
to protect himself from the victim in the future). Each summary presented identical information and
only differed with regard to the plea entered by the defendant. In the summaries, the defendant is
charged with second degree murder after the victim was found dead with two stab wounds to the back
and the defendant’s fingerprints were found on a murder weapon with eyewitness testimony
connecting the defendant to the crime. The vignettes were adapted from stimulus materials that had
been used in previous research on the insanity defense (Louden & Skeem, 2007; Roberts et al., 1987;
Schlumper, 2011; Skeem & Golding, 2001).
Measures
Demographics Questionnaire. Participants completed a demographics questionnaire. The
questionnaire asked participants to identify their gender, age, ethnicity, citizenship, whether they were
currently subject to felony charges, whether they had ever been convicted of a felony, and their degree
of belief in free-will. Degree of belief in free-will was assessed by simply asking participants, “To what
degree do you believe in free-will?” on a 1-9 scale (with 1 being “not at all” and 9 being “extremely”).
Participants were asked this question because free will is thought to be related to less acceptance of an
NGRI defense (Bloechl et.al., 2005). According to descriptive data for Study One, the mean score for
free-will was 7.66 on a 9 point scale. The questionnaire also asked participants, on a scale of 1-9, how
they felt about the plea of self-defense (with 1 being the most negative and 9 being the most positive)
(See Appendix C).
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Manipulation Check Questionnaire. Each participant completed a manipulation check
questionnaire tailored to the condition to which they were randomly assigned. The questionnaire asked
questions that assessed participants’ knowledge of core and relevant components of the case summary
they had read (e.g., what was the defendant’s plea) (See Appendix D).
State Trait Anger Scale (STAS). The State-Trait Anger Scale developed by Spielberger, Jacobs,
Russell, and Crane (1983) includes 20 items (10 per scale) and consists of two subscales: S-Anger - state
anger, which is an emotional state comprised of subjective feelings of tension, annoyance, irritation,
fury and rage; and T-Anger - trait anger which measures the individual differences in the frequency that
S-Anger was experienced over time (See Appendix E). The Cronbach’s Alpha for the current sample was
.91 for the full scale, .93 for the state anger scale, and .88 for the trait anger scale. The average score for
trait anger, amongst participants, was 16.49 on a 10-40 scale. The STAS is used in this study because it is
a well-known anger scale and it is also markedly shorter than other known anger scales. It has been
successfully used in health literature, can be used to assess anger in psychiatric and non-psychiatric
populations, and operationally distinguishing state anger from trait anger (Glancy & Saini, 2005).
Emotional Arousal Questionnaire (EAQ). The EAQ is a 16-item emotion self-report inventory
developed by Gross and Levenson (1995) (amusement, anger, arousal, confusion, contempt,
contentment, disgust, embarrassment, fear, happiness, interest, pain, relief, sadness, surprise, and
tension), which directs participants to “circle the number on the scale that best describes the greatest
amount of each emotion you felt at any time during the case you have just read. On this scale, 0 means
you did not feel even the slightest bit of the emotion and 8 is the most you have ever felt in your life.”
For the studies conducted for this dissertation, the questionnaire was modified to ask participants to
circle the number on the scale that best described the amount of each emotion they felt as a direct
result of the plea entered by the defendant (See Appendix F). The EAQ is used in this study because it
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has been successfully used in emotion and decision-making studies (Lerner & Tetlock, 1998) and
provides a brief way to measure myriad emotions. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the current sample was .93.
Punitive Judgment Instrument (PJI). To examine participants' punitiveness toward the
defendant (as appropriate for a case raising a question about the defendant's state of mind at the time
of the crime and the public concerns about the insanity defense) the Punitive Judgment Instrument (PJI)
was created for this study (see Appendix G). After each vignette, participants were asked on a 1-9 scale
(with 1 indicating “Not at all” and 9 indicating “Extremely”): (a) how intentional were the defendant's
actions; (b) how preventable were the defendant’s actions; (c) how controllable were the defendant’s
actions; (d) how fair would entering a PLEA of Not Guilty By (Insert Plea) be; (e) how fair would a
VERDICT of Not Guilty By (Insert Plea) be (for the participants in the NGRI and Self-Defense conditions);
(f) to what extent should the defendant be blamed; (g) to what extent should the defendant be
punished; (h) how reckless did the defendant seem to be; and (i) how reckless the defendant might be in
future situations. The participants were also asked: a) what verdict would you choose to give the
defendant, Not Guilty By (Insert Plea), Guilty, or Not Guilty; and b) how certain are you (on a 1-9 scale)
that this is the appropriate verdict?
A principle components factor analysis, using a direct oblimin rotation, was conducted using IBM
SPSS 19 (IBM Corp., 2010) to see if the items in the PJI had common unobserved variables and could be
reduced to subscales rather than being calculated separately. The factor analysis demonstrated that
items (a) intentionality, (f) blame, (g) punishment, (h) recklessness, and (i) future recklessness were one
factor (“Punishment Worthiness”) while items (b) preventability and (c) controllability were another
factor (“Controllability”). The items in the controllability factor had primary loadings over 0.90. The five
items in the punishment worthiness factor had primary loadings over 0.50. Four of the five items had
primary loadings over 0.80 (See Table K1). The Cronbach’s Alpha for the seven items was .88 (See Table
K2). The Cronbach’s Alpha for the controllability scale was .83 and .90 for the punishment worthiness

41

scale. The remaining items (plea fairness, verdict fairness, verdict, and verdict certainty) were not
included in the factor analysis or Cronbach’s Alpha analysis and were analyzed separately. The decision
to analyze the aforementioned items separately was made for several reasons: 1) Plea fairness, verdict
fairness, verdict, and verdict certainty arguably tap into a different aspect of punitive judgment than the
items comprising the controllability and punishment worthiness factors; 2) questions regarding plea
fairness, verdict fairness, verdict, and verdict certainty were not asked of participants in the no
information condition; 3) although one could combine plea and verdict fairness (as evidenced by an
exploratory factor analysis), it was arguably important to see if participants felt that the issue of plea
“fairness” versus verdict “fairness” were separate issues (e.g. the defendant had the right to plead NGRI
or it was fair to plead NGRI but a verdict of NGRI would not be fair, etc.); and 4) verdict was not a
continuous variable and thus was not measured on the same scale as the other items in the instrument.
Insanity Defense Attitude Scale-Revised (IDAS-R). The IDAS-R, which was administered to all
participants, measures attitudes toward the insanity defense (Skeem, 2004). The IDAS-R is a 32-item
measure that is scored on a seven-point Likert scale with 1 meaning “strongly disagree” to 7 meaning
“strongly agree.” Prior confirmatory factor analyses indicate a two factor solution of – “strict liability”
and “injustice and danger (Skeem, 2004).” The IDAS-R measures general attitudes regarding the insanity
defense and not attitudes regarding a specific test (e.g., McNaughton standard) (See Appendix H). The
Cronbach’s Alpha for the current sample was .94 for the full scale, .89 for the strict liability scale, and .93
for the injustice and danger scale.
Self-Defense Attitudes Scale. The Self-Defense Attitudes Scale, which was administered to all
participants, was designed for this study, in order to measure attitudes toward self-defense in a manner
comparable to the IDAS-R. Some of the items were identical to items in the IDAR-S but for the change in
terminology (insanity defense to self-defense) while other questions were not identical to questions in
the IDAS-R but rather were instead modeled after the IDAS-R to fit self-defense. The measure includes
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11 items and asked participants on a seven-point Likert scale (with 1 meaning “strongly disagree to 7
meaning “strongly agree”) questions that measured their attitudes toward the plea of self-defense. The
scale includes items such as: “The plea of self-defense should be abolished” and “The plea of selfdefense is mainly a rich person’s defense” (See Appendix I). The Cronbach’s Alpha for the current
sample was .94.
Procedure
Via Mturk, participants were invited to participate in a study on legal decision-making. They
were then asked to fill out a demographics questionnaire.
Participants were then randomly assigned to read a summary of a homicide case in one of three
conditions in which: 1) the defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI); 2) the defendant pled
not guilty by reason of self-defense; or, 3) no information about plea was provided.
Directly after reading a vignette the participants filled out a manipulation check questionnaire.
Afterwards all participants completed the State Trait Anger Scale (STAS). Then participants were asked
to fill out the Emotional Arousal Questionnaire (EAQ).
Participants were then asked to complete the Punitive Judgment Instrument. Participants in all
conditions then completed the IDAS-R and then the Self-Defense Attitudes Scale, in that order. Finally,
participants were provided with a written debriefing and thanked for their participation. Participants
received payment once it was verified that they had completed the study and had not participated more
than once.
Data Analysis Plan
Study One hypothesized that: 1) An insanity plea would increase punitive judgments as
compared to a plea of self-defense; 2) An insanity plea would increase anger as compared to a plea of
self-defense; and 3) Increases in anger would lead to increases in punitive judgment.
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In order to test these hypotheses, data analyses were conducted in SPSS 19 (IBM Corp., 2010)
and conducted in several phases. A factor analysis was conducted to see if the items in the PJI had
common unobserved variables and could be reduced to subscales rather than being calculated
separately. Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated to examine the internal consistency of the scale in this
sample. Descriptive statistics were analyzed in order to summarize and describe the data and assess the
normality of the data. Mediation analyses were conducted. A mediation relationship was not
established, thus a MANCOVA was run and assumptions were examined. MANCOVA was run to test
differences between group means (independent variable), after controlling for the effect of covariates.
For Hypothesis 1, an independent samples t-test was also run to test the difference in means for
several of the dependent variables (Plea Fairness, Verdict Fairness, and Verdict Certainty) for the NGRI
and self-defense conditions. This was done because the No Information condition was not asked about
Plea Fairness and Verdict Fairness.
A chi-square test for independence was run to analyze the relationship between plea and
verdict for the NGRI and self-defense conditions. Chi-square was used because plea and verdict are both
categorical variables.
For Hypothesis 3, a series of multiple regressions were run to see how well anger (as measured
by state anger and EAQ anger) predicted punishment worthiness and controllability. Multiple
regressions were run because both anger measures are continuous variables.
Statistical analyses were conducted as follows:
Step 1
a. Descriptive statistics - measures of central tendency and spread/dispersion were examined
in order to describe the data collected in order to test the hypotheses.
b. Exploratory statistics - to detect outliers and anomalies in the data collected.
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Step 2
For Hypothesis 1 (that an insanity plea would increase punitive judgments as compared to a plea
of self-defense): A factor analysis and Cronbach’s Alpha were run to see if items in the PJI had internal
consistency (interrelatedness among the items) and homogeneity (unidimentionality). Two subscales
were created: “Controllability” (preventable and controllable) and “Punishment Worthiness”
(intentionality, blameworthiness, punishment worthiness, recklessness, and future Recklessness). Plea
fairness, verdict fairness, verdict, and verdict certainty were analyzed separately.
Step 3
Descriptive statistics and a one-way ANOVA were used to analyze the manipulation check data.
Step 4
A series of linear regressions were run to test for a mediation relationship between plea, anger,
and punitive judgment variables.
Step 5
Since a mediation relationship was not established, correlation, one-way ANOVA, tests of
normality, and multivariate analysis of data were run to test several assumptions of MANCOVA
(correlation between covariates and dependent variables, independence of covariate, normal
distribution, and homogeneity of regression slopes). Correlation matrix data was used to determine
which variables were highly correlated to the dependent variables and thus would be appropriate to use
as covariates in the MANCOVA.
Step 6
For Hypothesis 1 (that an insanity plea would increase punitive judgments as compared to a plea
of self-defense): A MANCOVA was run to determine if differences in punishment worthiness and
controllability (DVs) scores existed for differing levels of plea (IV), after controlling for the potential
effect of IDAS-R scores (insanity bias), trait anger, and free-will (covariates).
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Independent samples t-tests were run to test the differences in means between the NGRI and
self-defense conditions for the dependent variables plea fairness, verdict fairness, and verdict certainty.
A chi-square test for independence was run to test the relationship between plea (NGRI and
self-defense) and verdict.
Step 7
For Hypothesis 2 (that an insanity plea would increase anger as compared to a plea of selfdefense): A MANCOVA was run to assess if there was a significant difference on anger scores (as
measured by the EAQ and state anger scores) for the participants assigned to the different plea levels
while controlling for the potential effect of IDAS-R scores, age, and trait anger.
Step 8
For Hypothesis 3 (that the increase in anger would mediate the relationship between the
insanity plea and any increase in punitive judgments): A series of multiple regressions were run to see
how well anger (a measured by state anger and EAQ anger) explained punishment worthiness and
controllability. See Figure A2 for a model of the proposed relationship between plea, anger, and punitive
judgment with covariates included.
Step 9
Post Hoc analyses were run for all hypotheses where necessary.
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Chapter 3: Study One Results
Data Transformations
Given that Study One did not have high frequencies of “other” racial groups, race was divided
into two groups, Caucasian and “all other” racial groups. The variables free-will, age, and trait anger
were transformed in order to address skew. After transforming the skewed variables, skew was reduced
to acceptable levels (below 0.40).
Manipulation Check
Removal of participants who failed the manipulation check questions resulted in conditions that
were uneven and skewed, thus all participants were included in data analysis. The majority of
participants in the NGRI condition (84%) were able to correctly identify the plea. 65.3% of participants in
the self-defense condition were able to correctly identify the plea. 46.6 percent of the participants in the
no information condition were able to correctly identify that no information was given with regard to
plea.
Regression Analysis
In order to explore the hypothesized mediation model (see Figure A1), which was that the
relationship between plea (A) and punitive judgment (C) is mediated by anger (B), a series of linear
regressions were conducted. Establishing mediation usually involves four steps. Step One establishes
that the independent variable is correlated with the dependent variable. Step Two establishes that the
independent variable is correlated with the mediator. Step Three establishes that the mediator affects
the dependent variable. Step Four establishes that the mediator completely mediates the relationship
between the independent and dependent variable. It is important to note that, in this study, punitive
judgment (C) is comprised of more than one item or subscale-Controllability and Punishment
Worthiness. Thus more than one regression was conducted to explore the relationship between plea (A)
and punitive judgment (C).
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Controllability.
Step One. A linear regression was conducted to ascertain the extent to which plea (A) predicted
controllability scores (C). Plea did not significantly predict controllability scores, β = -.017, 95% CI [-.486,
.451], p = .942. Plea predicted -0.3% of the total variance in controllability scores. Since the independent
variable was not correlated with the dependent variable the mediational analysis was not continued for
Controllability.
Punishment Worthiness.
Step One. A linear regression was carried out to ascertain the extent to which plea (A) predicted
punishment worthiness (C). Plea significantly predicted punishment worthiness, β = -1.232, 95% CI [2.163, -.301], p = .010. Plea also predicted 1.8% of the variance in punishment worthiness.
Step Two. Since the regression model significantly predicted punishment worthiness for the
independent variable, a regression analysis was then run to see whether the independent variable
predicted the hypothesized mediation variable (anger as measured by state anger and EAQ anger). It is
important to note that anger was assessed using two measures. Thus, more than one regression was
carried out to ascertain the extent to which plea (A) predicted anger (B).
First, a linear regression was conducted to ascertain the extent to which plea (A) predicted the
mediation variable state anger (B). Plea did not significantly predict state anger, β = -.27, 95% CI [-.93,
.39], p = .42. Plea predicted 0.2% of the variance in state anger.
Next, a linear regression was conducted to ascertain the degree to which plea (A) predicted EAQ
anger (B). Plea did not significantly predict EAQ anger, β = -.15, 95% CI [-.39, .080], p = .20. Plea
predicted 0.4% of the variance in EAQ anger. Since a mediation effect was not established, MANCOVA
analyses were run to test the relationship between the variables.
Hypothesis 1 (MANCOVA)
To assess whether an insanity plea increases punitive judgments as compared to a plea of self-
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defense, a MANCOVA was conducted to test mean differences between plea (NGRI, self-defense, no
information) and degree of punitive judgment (controllability and punishment worthiness) while
controlling for IDAS-R scores (insanity bias), trait anger, and free-will. A statistically significant
multivariate effect across the plea groups for the combined dependent variables (punishment
worthiness and controllability) was obtained: Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F (4, 744) = 2.40, p = .049 (see Table
K3). A statistically significant univariate effect was also obtained, showing that punishment worthiness
differed significantly across plea conditions: F (2, 373) = 3.72, p = .025 (see Table K4).
A post-hoc (Bonferroni) analysis indicated that participants in the NGRI (M = 36.6, SE = .63) and
no info (M = 36.7, SE = .61) groups found the defendant more punishment worthy than participants in
the self-defense (M = 34.60, SE = .64) group. However, only the difference between the no info and selfdefense groups was significant (see Table K5).
Hypothesis 1: Independent Samples T-Test (Plea Fairness; Verdict Fairness)
To assess whether an insanity plea increased punitive judgments as compared to a plea of selfdefense (with NGRI>self-defense) an independent samples t-test was conducted to test mean
differences between an NGRI and self-defense plea and punitive judgments (i.e., plea fairness and
verdict fairness). There was a significant difference (p = .013; p = .003) between NGRI (M = 2.18, SD =
1.88; M = 2.41, SD = 1.68) and self-defense (M = 3.86, SD = 2.29; M = 3.21, SD = 2.09) conditions across
plea fairness and verdict fairness (see Table K6), such that participants in the NGRI condition rated an
NGRI plea and verdict as less fair than their counterparts in the self-defense condition rated a plea and
verdict of self-defense (see Table K6).
Hypothesis 1: Independent Samples T-Test (Verdict Certainty)
An independent samples t-test revealed no a significant difference between NGRI and selfdefense conditions across verdict certainty (see Table K7).
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Hypothesis 1: Chi-square Test of Independence (Verdict)
A chi-square test of independence showed no relationship between plea condition and verdict,
X2 (2, N = 246) = 3.07, p = .22. The verdict selected by participants did not significantly differ by plea (see
Table K8).
Hypothesis 2
To assess whether an insanity plea increased anger, a MANCOVA was conducted controlling for
IDAS-R scores, age, and trait anger. The multivariate effect across groups for the combined dependent
variables (state anger and EAQ anger) was not significant: Wilks’ Lambda = .984, F (4, 744) = 1.54, p =
.19) (see Table K9). The univariate effect was also not significant. Thus, anger scores did not differ
significantly across conditions (see Table K10).
Hypothesis 3
A multiple regression was run to predict punishment worthiness from anger scores as measured
by state anger and EAQ anger. These variables did not statistically significantly predict punishment
worthiness, State Anger: β = -.078, 95% CI [-.248, .092+, p = .092; EAQ Anger: β = -.142, 95% CI [-.342,
.626], p = .626. R2=.002 (N=376, p = .662) (see Table K11).
Similarly, anger scores (as measured by state anger and EAQ anger) did not significantly predict
controllability, State Anger: β = -.013, 95% CI [-.097, .072+, p = .772; EAQ Anger: β = -.032, 95% CI [-.274,
.209], p = .792. R2 = .001 (N=376, p = .847) (see Table K12).
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Chapter 4: Study Two Methods

Study Two was designed to further explore the role that anger might play in punitive judgments
toward the insanity defense. In this study, certain factors known to be associated with insanity defense
bias were manipulated – specifically, medication non-compliance and prior history (with the victim) to
provide insight into the underlying emotional response. It was hypothesized that medication noncompliance would be seen as the biggest norm violation and produce the highest punitive ratings,
followed by the prior history condition, both of which would be different than the control condition in
which neither variable was present.
Therefore, the overall design for Study Two was a between subjects one factor design with three
levels (Responsibility/Norm Violation: “Control/Standard,” “Medication Non-Compliance,” and “Prior
History with Victim” for Hypotheses 1 and 2) and a between subjects two factor design (STAS anger and
EAQ anger for Hypothesis 3), with the following hypotheses:
1) Increased norm violation/perceived responsibility leads to an increase in punitive
judgments (with medication non-compliance>prior history>standard);
2) Increased norm violation/perceived responsibility leads to increased anger (with
medication non-compliance>prior history>standard);
3) Increases in anger would lead to increases in punitive judgments.
If the results supported all three hypotheses then this would indicate that anger mediates the
relationship between norm violation/perceived responsibility and punitive judgments. A mediation
model was designed in order to illustrate the hypothesized mediation model (see Figure A3).
Participants
There were 388 participants in the study, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk). Of the
379 participants, 167 were male and 221 were female. 10.3% were African American, 1.3% were Native
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American, 5.9% were Asian, 0.3% were Pacific Islander, 1.8% were biracial, 73.2% were Caucasian, 5.7%
were Hispanic, and 1.5% identified as other. Participants were of legal age to consent to participate in a
research project. In addition, participants were jury eligible. Thus, participants were: United States
citizens, at least 18 years of age, not currently subject to felony charges, and never convicted of a felony.
Participants were paid 25 cents for their participation. Overall, 57% of the participants were female. The
average age for participants was 34.40 (SD = 12.14).
Materials
Case Vignettes. The vignette used in Study One was modified for Study Two. Thus, participants
were randomly assigned to either read: 1) a summary of a homicide case in which the defendant pled
not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) (“Control/Standard”); 2) the same summary but with an addition
that the NGRI defendant had a history of non-compliance with medication (“Medication NonCompliance”); or 3) the same summary but with an addition that the NGRI defendant had a prior
acrimonious history with the victim (“Prior History with Victim”). The plea in all vignettes was the same
(NGRI). Information about plea was followed by three to four paragraphs containing information about
the case. The vignettes provided brief background information about the victim’s actions prior to his
death and information that aided the police in the arrest of the defendant in the vignette. In the
summaries, the defendant is charged with second degree murder after the victim was found dead with
two stab wounds to the back and the defendant’s fingerprints were found on a murder weapon with
eyewitness testimony connecting the defendant to the crime. Each summary presented identical
information and only differed with regard to case facts manipulating perceived responsibility (i.e., the
medication non-compliance vignette contained a paragraph highlighting the fact that the defendant was
prescribed medication but did not take said medication while the prior history vignette contained
information about past acrimonious interactions the defendant had with the victim). The vignettes were
adapted from stimulus materials that that had been used in previous research on the insanity defense
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(Louden & Skeem, 2007; Roberts et al., 1987; Schlumper, 2011; Skeem & Golding, 2001) (See Appendix
J).
Measures
Demographics Questionnaire. Participants completed a demographics questionnaire. The
questionnaire asked participants to identify their gender, age, ethnicity, citizenship, whether they were
currently subject to felony charges, whether they had ever been convicted of a felony, and their degree
of belief in free-will. The mean score for free-will was 7.70 on a 9 point scale. The questionnaire also
asked participants, on a scale of 1-9, how they felt about the plea of self-defense (with 1 being the most
negative and 9 being the most positive) (See Appendix D).
Manipulation Check Questionnaire. Each participant completed a manipulation check
questionnaire tailored to the condition to which they were randomly assigned. The questionnaire asked
questions that assessed participants’ knowledge of core and relevant components of the case summary
they had read (e.g., what was the defendant’s plea) (See Appendix E).
State Trait Anger Scale (STAS). As described in Study One. The average score for trait anger,
amongst participants, was 16.70 on a 10-40 scale. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the current sample for the
full scale was .90, .88 for the trait anger scale, and .90 for the state anger scale (See Appendix F).
Emotional Arousal Questionnaire (EAQ). As described in Study One. The Cronbach’s Alpha for
the current study was .93 (See Appendix G).
Punitive Judgment Instrument (PJI). The same Punitive Judgment Instrument that was
developed for Study One was administered in Study Two (See Appendix H).
A factor analysis and Cronbach’s Alpha were calculated to see if the items in the PJI had internal
consistency (interrelatedness among the items) and homogeneity (unidimentionality) in order to
determine if the items in the PJI would be calculated separately for each participant or grouped
together.
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A principle components factor analysis, using a direct oblimin rotation, was conducted using IBM
SPSS 19 (IBM Corp., 2010) to see if the items in the PJI had common unobserved variables and could be
reduced to subscales rather than being calculated separately. The factor analysis demonstrated that
items (a) intentionality, (f) blame, (g) punishment, (h) recklessness, and (i) future recklessness were one
factor (“Punishment Worthiness”) while items (b) preventability and (c) controllability were another
factor (“Controllability”). The items in the controllability factor had primary loadings over .80. The five
items in the Punishment Worthiness factor had primary loadings over .50. Three of the five items in the
Punishment Worthiness factor had primary loadings over. 7 (see Table K134). The Cronbach’s Alpha for
the seven items was .85 (See Table K145). The Cronbach’s Alpha for the controllability scale was .71 and
.85 for the punishment worthiness scale. The remaining items that were analyzed (plea fairness, verdict
fairness, verdict, and verdict certainty) were not included in the factor analysis or Cronbach’s Alpha
analysis and were analyzed separately.
The decision to analyze the aforementioned items separately was made for several reasons: 1)
Plea fairness, verdict fairness, verdict, and verdict certainty arguably tap into a different aspect of
punitive judgment than the items comprising the controllability and punishment worthiness factors; 2)
although one could combine plea and verdict fairness (as evidenced by an exploratory factor analysis), it
was arguably important to see if participants felt that the issue of plea “fairness” versus verdict
“fairness” were separate issues; and 3) verdict was not a continuous variable and thus was not
measured on the same scale as the other items in the instrument.
Insanity Defense Attitude Scale-Revised (IDAS-R). As described in Study One (See Appendix I).
The Cronbach’s Alpha for the current sample was .93 for the full scale, .90 for the strict liability scale,
and .90 for the injustice and danger scale.
Self-Defense Attitudes Scale. As described in Study One (See Appendix J). The Cronbach’s Alpha
for the current study was .92.
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Procedure
Participants were told that they were participating in a study on legal decision-making. They
were then asked to fill out a demographics questionnaire.
Participants were then randomly assigned to read either: 1) a summary of a homicide case in
which the defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) (same vignette from Study One), 2) the
same summary with an added history of non-compliance with medication, or 3) the same summary with
an added history of a past acrimonious history with the victim.
Directly after reading a vignette the participants filled out a manipulation check questionnaire.
Afterwards all participants filled out the State Trait Anger Scale (STAS). Participants were then asked to
fill out the Emotional Arousal Questionnaire (EAQ). Afterwards all participants completed the PJI.
All participants then filled out the IDAS-R and the Self-Defense Attitudes Scale, in that order (the
Self-Defense Attitudes Scale was administered to see if attitudes about self-defense were significantly
correlated with other variables of interest in the study). Finally, participants were provided with a
written debriefing and thanked for their participation. Participants received payment once it was
verified that they had completed the study and had not participated more than once.
Data Analysis Plan
Study Two had three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 stated that: Increased norm violation/perceived
responsibility leads to an increase in punitive judgment (with medication non-compliance>prior
history>standard). Hypothesis 2 stated that: Increased norm violation/perceived responsibility leads to
increased anger (with medication non-compliance>prior history>standard). Hypothesis 3 stated that:
Increases in anger would lead to increases in punitive judgments. In order to test these hypotheses, data
analyses were conducted in SPSS 19 (IBM Corp., 2010) and conducted in several phases.
Step 1
a. Descriptive statistics were run in order to summarize the data. Measures of central
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tendency and spread/dispersion were examined in order to describe the data collected in
order to test the hypotheses.
b. Exploratory statistics were run in order to detect outliers and anomalies in the data
collected.
Step 2
For Hypothesis 1 (increased norm violation/perceived responsibility leads to an increase in
punitive judgment): A factor analysis and Cronbach’s Alpha were run to see if the items in the PJI had
internal consistency (interrelatedness among the items) and homogeneity (unidimentionality). The
items in the PJI were separated into two groups: Controllability (preventable and controllable)
punishment worthiness (intentional, blameworthiness, punishment worthiness, recklessness, and future
recklessness). Plea fairness, verdict fairness, verdict, and verdict certainty were analyzed separately.
Step 3
Descriptive statistics, an independent samples t-test, and a one-way ANOVA were used to
analyze the manipulation check data.
Step 4
A series of linear and logistic regressions were run to test for a mediation relationship between
responsibility conditions, anger, and punitive judgment variables.
Step 5
Since a mediation relationship was not established, correlation, exploratory statistics, and
multivariate analysis of data were run to test several assumptions of MANCOVA (correlation between
covariates and dependent variables, independence of covariate, normal distribution, and homogeneity
of regression slopes). Correlation matrix data was used to determine which variables were highly
correlated to the dependent variables and thus would be appropriate to use as covariates in the
MANCOVA.
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Step 6
For Hypothesis 1: A MANCOVA was run to determine whether differences in punishment
worthiness, controllability, plea fairness, verdict fairness, and verdict certainty scores (DVs) existed for
differing levels of responsibility (IV), after controlling for the potential effect of IDAS-R scores (insanity
bias) (covariate).
A chi-square test for independence was run to test the relationship between differing levels of
responsibility and verdict.
Step 7
For Hypothesis 2 (increased norm violation/perceived responsibility leads to increased anger): A
MANCOVA was run to assess if there was a significant difference on anger scores (as measured by the
EAQ and state anger scores) for the participants assigned to read the different responsibility vignettes
while controlling for the potential effect of IDAS-R scores and trait anger. See Figure A4 for a model of
the proposed relationship between norm violation, anger, and punitive judgment with covariates.
Step 8
For Hypothesis 3 (increases in anger would lead to increases in punitive judgments): A series of
multiple regressions were run to see how well anger (as measured by state anger and EAQ anger)
predicted punishment worthiness, controllability, plea fairness, verdict fairness, and verdict certainty.
Multiple regressions were run because both anger measures are continuous variables.
Since anger (as measured by state and EAQ anger) was a continuous variable, a discriminant
analysis was run to see if anger scores predicted verdict.
Step 9
Post Hoc analyses were run for all hypotheses when necessary.
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Chapter 5: Study Two Results
Data Transformations
Given that Study Two did not have high frequencies of other racial groups, race was divided into
two groups, Caucasian and all other racial groups. The variables free-will, age, and trait anger were
transformed in order to address skew. For the variable that was negatively skewed (free-will), the
variable was log transformed (reflect and Log10). For the variables that were positively skewed (age and
trait anger) a log transformation (Log10) was performed. After transforming the skewed variables, skew
was reduced to acceptable levels (below 0.36).
Manipulation Check
Due to an error when constructing the study on Psychsurveys.com, participants in the control
condition were not asked the first manipulation check question. For that reason and in order to avoid
imbalance between participant groups, all participants were included in data analysis. With regard to
the second and third manipulation check question, analysis of the data showed that the majority of
participants, 96.1% had carefully read the vignette and were able to correctly identify whether or not
the victim had been stabbed twice in the back. Further analysis of manipulation check data showed that
the majority of participants, 95.1% were able to correctly identify whether or not the defendant had
been hospitalized.
Regression Analysis
In order to explore the hypothesized mediation model (see Figure A3), which was that the
relationship between norm violation/perceived responsibility (A) and punitive judgment (C) is mediated
by anger (B), a series of linear and logistic regressions were conducted. It is important to note that, in
this study, punitive judgment (C) is comprised of more than one item or subscale-punishment
worthiness, controllability, plea fairness, verdict fairness, verdict, and verdict certainty (these
subscales/items served as the dependent variables in the regression analyses). The relationship between
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norm violation/perceived responsibility and verdict was tested using a logistic regression because
verdict was a dichotomous dependent variable (NGRI and guilty after removing the not guilty verdicts; N
= 5).
Controllability.
Step one. A linear regression was conducted to ascertain the extent to which norm
violation/perceived responsibility (A) predicted controllability scores (C). Norm violation/perceived
responsibility did not significantly predict controllability, β = .22, 95% CI *-.26, .70], p = .36. Norm
violation/ perceived responsibility predicted 0.2% of the total variance in controllability scores. Since the
independent variable was not correlated with the dependent variable the mediational analysis was not
continued for controllability.
Punishment worthiness.
Step one. A linear regression was then conducted to ascertain the extent to which norm
violation/perceived responsibility (A) predicted punishment worthiness (C). Norm violation/perceived
responsibility did not significantly predict punishment worthiness, β = .13, 95% CI *-.80, 1.07], p = .78.
Norm violation/ perceived responsibility predicted 0.0% of the total variance in punishment worthiness.
Since the independent variable was not correlated with the dependent variable the mediational analysis
was not continued for punishment worthiness.
Plea fairness.
Step one. A linear regression was then conducted to ascertain the extent to which norm
violation/perceived responsibility (A) predicted plea fairness (C). Norm violation/perceived responsibility
did not significantly predict verdict fairness (C), β = -.081, 95% CI [-.38, .22], p = .60. Norm
violation/perceived responsibility predicted 0.5% of the total variance in plea fairness. Since the
independent variable was not correlated with the dependent variable the mediational analysis was not
continued for plea fairness.
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Verdict fairness.
Step one. A linear regression was then conducted to ascertain the extent to which norm
violation/perceived responsibility (A) predicted verdict fairness (C). Norm violation/perceived
responsibility did not significantly predict verdict fairness (C), β = -.22, 95% CI [-.51, .08], p = .15. Norm
violation/perceived responsibility predicted 0.5% of the total variance in verdict fairness. Since the
independent variable was not correlated with the dependent variable the mediational analysis was not
continued for verdict fairness.
Verdict certainty.
Step one. A linear regression was then conducted to ascertain the extent to which norm
violation/perceived responsibility (A) predicted verdict certainty (C). Norm violation/perceived
responsibility did not significantly predict verdict certainty (C), β = -.06, 95% CI [-.31, .19], p = .63. Norm
violation/perceived responsibility predicted 0.1% of the total variance in verdict certainty. Since the
independent variable was not correlated with the dependent variable the mediational analysis was not
continued for verdict certainty.
Verdict.
Step one. A logistic regression was conducted to ascertain the degree to which norm
violation/perceived responsibility (dummy coded into a dichotomous variable; medication noncompliance and prior history) predicted verdict (NGRI and guilty). The logistic regression model was
statistically significant, X2= 8.23, p = 0.016. The model explained 2.9% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in
verdict and correctly classified 62.7% of cases. Being a participant in the medication non-compliance
condition was associated with a 1.82 (Exp (B) = 1.82, 95% CI [1.10, 2.99]) increase in selecting a guilty
verdict versus an NGRI verdict. Being a participant in the prior history condition was associated with a
1.98 (Exp (B) = 1.98, 95% CI [1.18, 3.34]) increase in selecting a guilty verdict versus an NGRI verdict.
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Step two. After establishing a predictive relationship between the independent variable and the
dependent variable, the next step involved testing for a predictive relationship between the
independent variable and the hypothesized mediation variable. Thus, two linear regressions were run to
test the relationship between the independent variable (plea) and the hypothesized mediator variables
(state anger and EAQ anger).
First, a linear regression was conducted to ascertain the extent to which norm
violation/perceived responsibility (A) predicted state anger (B). Norm violation/perceived responsibility
did not significantly predict state anger (B), β = --.41, 95% CI [-.99, .17], p = .17. Norm
violation/perceived responsibility predicted 0.5% of the variance in state anger.
Next, a linear regression was conducted to ascertain the extent to which norm
violation/perceived responsibility (A) predicts EAQ anger (B). Norm violation/perceived responsibility did
not significantly predict EAQ anger (B), β = -.083, 95% CI [-.32, .15], p = .49. Norm violation/perceived
responsibility predicted 0.1% of the variance in EAQ anger.
Since a mediational relationship was not established MANCOVA analyses were run to test the
relationship between the variables.
Hypothesis 1 (MANCOVA)
To assess whether increased norm violation/perceived responsibility leads to an increase in
punitive judgments (with medication non-compliance>prior history>standard), a MANCOVA was
conducted on type of norm violation/perceived responsibility and degree of punitive judgment
(controllability, punishment worthiness, verdict fairness, verdict, and verdict certainty) while controlling
for IDAS-R scores (insanity bias). There was no significant multivariate outcome, in respect of the
combined dependent variables across the norm violation groups: Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F (10, 760) =
55.928, p = .64 (see Table 15). There were also no univariate outcomes (see Table K16).
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Hypothesis 1: Chi-square Test of Independence (Verdict)
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between norm
violation and verdict. The relation between these variables was not significant, X2 (4, N = 388) = 8.86, p =
.07. The verdict selected by participants did not significantly differ by plea (see Table K17).
Hypothesis 2 (MANCOVA)
To assess whether increased norm violation/perceived responsibility leads to increased anger
(with medication non-compliance>prior history>standard), a MANCOVA was conducted to ascertain
differences in means between type of norm violation/perceived responsibility and degree of anger while
controlling for IDAS-R scores and trait anger.
A statistically significant multivariate effect across conditions for the combined dependent
variables (state anger and EAQ anger) was obtained: Wilks’ Lambda = .97, F (4, 754) = 3.39, p = .009 (see
Table K18). The univariate outcome showed that state anger and EAQ anger differed across the groups
of norm violation: state anger (F (2, 378) = 6.276), p = .002) and EAQ anger (F (2, 378) = 3.859, p = .022)
(see Table K19). A post-hoc (Bonferroni) analysis indicated that participants in the medication noncompliance group (M = 14.3, SE = .38; M = 3.19, SE = .15) reported more anger (state and EAQ), after
reading the vignettes, than participants in the prior history group (M = 12.5, SE = .39; M = 2.61, SE = .16)
(see Table K20).
Hypothesis 3 (Multiple Regression and Discriminant Analysis)
A multiple regression was run to predict punishment worthiness from anger scores as measured
by state anger and EAQ anger. These variables significantly predicted punishment worthiness, State
Anger: β = -.266, 95% CI [-.46, -.07+, p = .009; EAQ Anger: β = 1.068, 95% CI *.57, 1.56+, p = .000, R2=.045
(N=385, p = .000) (see Table K21).
A multiple regression was run to predict controllability from anger scores as measured by state
anger and EAQ anger. Overall, the model/variables significantly predicted controllability scores, R2 = .017
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(N=385, p = .040). However, only EAQ anger added to the prediction, State Anger: β = -.083, 95% CI [-.19,
.020+, p = .11; EAQ Anger: β = .333, 95% CI *.076, .59+, p = .011 (see Table K22).
A multiple regression was run to predict plea fairness from anger scores as measured by state
anger and EAQ anger. These variables did not statistically significantly predict plea fairness, State Anger:
β = -.032, 95% CI [-.097, .033+, p = .34; EAQ Anger: β = .039, 95% CI *-.12, .20], p = .64. R2 = .002 (N=385,
p = .62) (see Table K23).
A multiple regression was run to predict verdict fairness from anger scores as measured by state
anger and EAQ anger. These variables did not statistically significantly predict verdict fairness, State
Anger: β = -.024, 95% CI [-.040, .088+, p = .467; EAQ Anger: β = .036, 95% CI *-.20, .12], p = .66, R2 = .001
(N=385, p = .77) (see Table K24).
A multiple regression was run to predict verdict certainty from anger scores as measured by
state anger and EAQ anger. Overall, the model/variables did not significantly predict verdict certainty, R2
= .014 (N=385, p = .062). However, EAQ anger added to the prediction (while state anger did not), State
Anger: β = -.027, 95% CI [-.079, .026+, p = .33; EAQ Anger: β = .15, 95% CI *.022, .29+, p = .022 (see Table
K25).
Discriminant analysis was used to test whether differences in anger would lead to differences in
verdict. The overall Chi-square test was significant (Wilks’ Lambda = .958, Chi-square = 16.4, df = 4,
Canonical correlation = .20, p = .003) (see Table K26). Thus, the variables predict verdict at a statically
significant level. The variables were better able to predict NGRI (72%) and Not Guilty (60%) verdicts than
they were able to predict Guilty (15.4%) verdicts. Overall, 36.9% of the cases are classified correctly.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
Study One
Hypotheses, Major Findings, Interpretation. Study One had three hypotheses. 1) An insanity
plea would increase punitive judgment as compared to a plea of self-defense; 2) An insanity plea would
increase anger as compared to a plea of self-defense; and 3) Increases in anger would lead to increases
in punitive judgment. In this study, perceptions of controllability, punishment worthiness, plea fairness,
verdict fairness, verdict, and verdict certainty were used to measure punitive judgment.
The results supported Hypothesis 1 (that, an insanity plea would increase punitive judgments as
compared to a plea of self-defense) in part but did not support either Hypothesis 2 (that an insanity plea
would increase anger as compared to a plea of self-defense) or Hypothesis 3 (that increases in anger
would lead to increases in punitive judgment).
With regard to Hypothesis 1, in terms of punitive judgment, potential jurors considered a plea
and verdict of NGRI to be less fair than a plea and verdict of self-defense, given the same case facts.
With regard to Hypothesis 1, jurors were also significantly more likely to see the defendant as
blameworthy, punishment worthy, reckless and potentially reckless in the future when no information
was given about plea as compared to a plea of self-defense. This finding might seem surprising given
that Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock (1999) found that individuals are more punitive only when the actor
goes unpunished (but not when the actor is punished or no information is given about punishment).
However, their study explored the relationship between primed anger and its influence on punitive
judgments with regard to unrelated acts. In this current study, participants were making punitive
judgments on the act directly related to their primed anger.
Overall, these findings suggest that the insanity defense is subject to bias (as evidenced by the
increase in some punitive judgments rendered when a defendant pled insanity as compared to when a
defendant pled self-defense).
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Previous Research. In general, the findings from Study One are supported by previous research.
For example, previous research suggests that individuals feel that the “insane” should be punished
(Hans, 1986) and when individuals have a choice between NGRI, GBMI, and guilty vs. NGRI and guilty,
given the same case facts (representing a prototypical NGRI case), individuals are more likely to choose
GBMI (Robert and Golding, 1991). In their study, NGRI verdicts were given 60% of the time in NGRI vs.
guilty conditions, and only 35% of the time in NGRI vs. guilty vs. GBMI conditions. The results of their
study show that even in a prototypical insanity case, jurors desired a more punitive verdict (thus the
drift to GBMI when it is an available verdict option).
Given previous research on the insanity defense, it is not surprising that potential jurors (in this
study) determined that a plea and verdict of NGRI were unfair (compared to a plea of self-defense) and
were more likely to find the defendant guilty (as compared to when the defendant plead self-defense).
The results of this current study reinforce data suggesting that even if case facts fit a defense of insanity,
potential jurors will still desire the defendant punished regardless of what the law prescribes.
Although not all of Study One’s hypotheses were supported, this study expanded upon previous
research by comparing insanity to another comparable defense, in this case self-defense. Previous
research, generally, focused either on attitudes about the insanity defense or verdict selection in
insanity cases. This current study provided perspective on how individuals react to the insanity defense
in comparison to another affirmative defense. This allowed exploration of not only whether potential
jurors are biased toward the insanity defense but also whether this bias extends to other similar
defenses or is specific to the insanity defense. This is important because it helps rule out the possibility
that the bias shown toward the insanity defense is no greater than the bias that potential jurors exhibit
toward any other affirmative defense.
The fact that this current study showed differences between pleading insanity and pleading selfdefense, suggests that there is something about the insanity defense that elicits a more punitive
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response (in some regards) and that potential jurors do not regard all affirmative defenses in the same
way. Both NGRI and self-defense are affirmative defenses. Thus, they are both a defense in which the
defendant can introduce evidence, which, if found credible, will negate liability, even though the
defendant has to acknowledge that he committed the alleged acts (Robinson, 1982).
NGRI and self-defense differ in that NGRI is an excuse defense and self-defense is a justification
defense. In the legal system, justification means that the act in question was justifiable and the
defendant’s conduct permissible. So, the defendant’s behavior is approved and the consequences of
their actions are seen as fair (Robinson, 1982). An excuse defense differs from a justification defense in
that the defendant is exempt from criminal liability because of a quality/characteristic they possess as
opposed to some quality or characteristic of the events that preceded the defendant’s actions. In order
to meet criteria for an excuse defense at least one of four conditions must be met: (1) the act is not
voluntary; (2) the actor does not perceive the physical nature or consequences of their actions; (3) the
actor does not know his actions are wrong or criminal; or, (4) the actor is unable to control his actions
(Robinson, 1982). Thus, justification is based on the quality of the act (or the situation) which justifies
the defendant’s actions whereas excuse is based on some quality in the defendant that frees them from
liability due to the effect of that characteristic on the defendant’s status or capacity.
As previously theorized in this dissertation, it is possible that the differences between NGRI and
self-defense, seen in this study, occur because insanity (or a pre-existing mental illness) is not seen as a
“justifying condition” thus NGRI is not seen as a legitimate excuse or a legitimate defense. Thus, a plea
of insanity results in greater levels of punitive judgment than a plea of self-defense. Individuals perhaps
can more readily accept that they (or the defendant) cannot control the acts of others than they can
accept that they (or the defendant) cannot control their own actions. Thus, self-defense is considered a
“justification” defense (e.g., the defendant’s actions were justified and do not warrant punishment)
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while insanity is seen as an “excuse” defense (e.g., a defendant’s attempt to excuse his/her criminal
behavior and avoid deserved punishment).
This theory is supported by the fact that, in field research, excuses and mitigating conditions do
not always seem to reduce the desire for retribution, at least with respect to the insanity defense, even
though this reduction is seen in laboratory studies (Vidmar, 2001). When looking at insanity cases,
results from field studies suggest that individuals do not perceive insanity as a legitimate defense and
that members of the community perceive the defendant as responsible and worthy of punishment
(Vidmar, 2001).
Alternative Explanations of the Findings. The lack of support for Hypotheses 2 and 3, while
potentially explained by limitations of the study (which will be discussed later) can also be accounted for
by alternative theories. In particular, correlation data from the current study suggests that other
variables such as disgust, contempt, and fear (in addition to anger) were also correlated with the
independent and dependent variables. Thus, it is possible that plea did not significantly increase anger
scores, and anger scores did not significantly predict punitive judgments, because anger scores are not
only affected by plea, and punitive judgments are not only affected by anger, but also by other emotions
such as contempt, disgust, and/or fear. Literature suggests that moral outrage occurs when individuals
feel a moral transgression has occurred (and that moral outrage is a combination of anger and disgust as
well as possibly contempt) (Peter-Hagene, Jay, and Salerno, 2014). Thus, it is possible that plea alone
does not affect anger levels but only affects anger when levels of other emotions such as contempt,
disgust, and fear are at certain levels. Along the same lines, it is possible that anger alone does not affect
punitive judgments but only affects punitive judgments when levels of other emotions are at certain
levels.
Existing literature in moral psychology suggests that when individuals observe a moral
transgression they feel moral outrage. In the literature, some studies define moral outrage as a cognitive
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(e.g., attributions of blame), behavioral (e.g., desire to punish), and emotional response (e.g., anger) to
perceived bad behaviors (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Lotz, Okimoto,
Schlosser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011; Skitka, Bauman, Mullen, 2004; Tetlock et al., 2000; Tetlock, Kristel,
Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). In general, the greater the level of moral outrage felt, the more harm an
individual feels has occurred, and the more punishment the individual feels is necessary to nullify the
harm caused and restore the balance of justice (Peter-Hagene, Jay, and Salerno, 2014). Thus, moral
outrage increases the likelihood of punitive judgments. Additionally, while some existing literature
defines moral outrage as anger other literature defines moral outrage as a combination of anger and
disgust (Peter-Hagene, Jay, & Salerno, 2014). In that study, Peter-Hagene, Jay, and Salerno (2014), found
that it was the combination of anger and disgust that predicted how much moral outrage individuals felt
towards offenders. Furthermore, and most importantly, neither emotion worked independently to
increase moral outrage. The impact of one (on moral outrage) was dependent on the impact of the
other. So, if an individual felt angrier this would only lead to an increase in moral outrage if the
individual had also experienced at least a moderate level of disgust (Peter-Hagene, Jay, & Salerno,
2014). Thus, although people often believe that anger and moral outrage are one and the same,
research indicated that anger is unrelated to moral outrage if the angry individual is not simultaneously
experiencing disgust (Peter-Hagene, Jay, & Salerno, 2014). The reverse was also found to be true.
Disgust was unrelated to moral outrage if the disgusted individual was not simultaneously experiencing
anger. Thus, one cannot predict moral outrage from anger without also knowing how disgusted an
individual was. This might potentially explain why plea alone was not able to predict or account for an
increase in anger in the current study and why anger alone was not able to affect punitive judgments. It
is possible that one cannot effectively or reliably predict anger from plea or punitive judgment from plea
without also knowing how disgusted an individual was (or without also additionally knowing how much
contempt and/or fear they felt).
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Limitations. There were a number of limitations that potentially impacted the findings of Study
One. For example, because Mturk participants are completely anonymous it is not possible to verify
demographic information and Mturk workers may not have truthfully answered the demographic
information required to participate in this study. Furthermore, Mturk provides a lack of environmental
control. While some Mturk workers may be conducting the study in a quiet environment with few
distractions, other Mturk workers may be engaged in any number of other activities, or exposed to any
number of distractions, while participating in the study. This possibility is especially problematic for a
study like the one conducted for this dissertation since it relies heavily on attention and emotion.
Another potential limitation of this study was the use of vignettes. Although the use of vignettes
allows for consistency, there is something lost in ability to elicit as strong an emotional reaction as
another form of presenting case information. In addition, with regard to the vignette used in Study One,
although based on a vignette successfully used in prior research, the vignette was significantly pared
down and simplified so that the same vignette could be used in each condition (thus eliminating the
potential impact of differing case facts on the results). Thus, the insanity vignette may not have been
able to elicit the level of emotional reaction necessary to tease apart any differences in anger between
participants in different conditions.
One of the methodological issues encountered in the study, that potentially affected the results,
was that participants in the no information (about plea) condition were not asked if they thought a plea
and verdict of NGRI/self-defense would be fair. This omission was intentional as the participants in the
no information condition received no information about plea and thus would have been unable to
answer the two aforementioned items. However, this omission presented an issue when it came time to
analyze the data. Since only two of the three conditions were asked the two questions regarding plea
and verdict fairness, it was not possible to run a MANCOVA on those particular items. Thus, an
independent samples t-test was run for the items addressing plea fairness and verdict fairness. Another
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methodological issue occurred for the item addressing what verdict participants would choose to give
the defendant. While participants in the NGRI and self-defense conditions only had three options to
choose from, the participants in the no information condition had four options to choose from making a
MANCOVA analysis also hard to run for the verdict item. Thus, an independent sample t-test was also
run on verdict and verdict certainty.
Generalizability. Research suggests that Mturk users in the United States better reflect the U.S.
population that the traditional college pool often used for research. Thus, with regard to gender, race,
age, and education Mturk workers better represent the U.S. population than university students and are
at least as representative as other internet samples (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Berinsky,
Huber, & Lenz, 2011).Thus, the practical implications of the findings are that individuals pleading
insanity are subject to a greater level of bias than those who do not plead NGRI. This fact is concerning
considering it should be perceived in the same way other affirmative defenses are perceived. However,
the data suggest that this is not the case. In which case, defendants pleading NGRI may not be getting
their 6th amendment right to a fair trial.
Impact. Given the aforementioned, there are possible avenues to consider such as whether
there is some way to alert jury members about their potential bias or anger as studies have shown that
making individuals aware of the aforementioned can reduce the effect of bias or negative emotions
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Plant & Devine, 2001; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001; Richeson &
Nussbaum, 2004; Casey, Warren, Cheesman, and Elek, 2012). Even the clinical literature on anger
indicates that psychoeducation and awareness of anger helps to reduce anger in individuals (DeLucia,
2004; Glancy & Saini, 2005; Jongsma & Bruce, 2011). According to bias reduction literature there are
several potential strategies that could help alleviate bias (Casey, Warren, Cheesman, and Elek, 2012;
Kang, Bennett, Carbado, Casey, Dasgupta, Faigman, Godsil, Greenwald, Levinson, & Mnookin, 2012). In
addition, since judges are not immune to bias strategies should target both judges and jurors.
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The literature suggests that knowledge of bias and the negative impact it can have on judgment,
decision-making, and behavior motivates individuals to reduce their bias. By itself, knowledge of bias
and its impact cannot eradicate or combat bias (Green, Carney, Pallin, Ngo, Raymond, Iezzoni, & Banaji,
2007). However, it may be the impetus that fosters the accrual of tools that more effectively combat
bias. Thus, an important initial strategy could involve educating judges and jurors about insanity defense
bias and how that bias can impact judgment and decision-making. Research suggests that motivation to
reduce bias and be egalitarian occurs when an individual receive facts about bias. In other words, if
judges and potential jurors are convinced that there is a problem they will be motivated to address said
problem. For judges, this education can take place outside of the courtroom. For jurors, judges can
potentially spend time discussing bias and its impact during jury selection and make an effort to remind
jurors about bias over the course of the trial.
Another strategy suggested in the literature is to foster an appreciation of and sensitivity to
group and individual differences if judges and jurors are involved in a trial involving a group that is
subject to bias. Research indicates that a “color blind” approach (ignoring/avoiding differences between
social groups) is not only an ineffective way to reduce bias but also actually increases bias (Rudman,
Ashmore, & Gary, 2001; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). Thus in insanity defense cases, jurors should be
encouraged to think about and ask questions about the bias that the mentally ill, in general, or those
raising the insanity defense, in particular, face. Furthermore, they should be encouraged to think about
and ask questions (especially during deliberations) about how the particular mental illness or deficit, in
question, could have impacted behavior at the time of the crime (given the insanity defense standard
they are being asked to consider).
In addition to education and fostering appreciation and sensitivity to bias and differences, the
literature suggests providing judges and jurors with research based techniques that are clear, specific,
and concrete. Thus, for example, it may not be enough to simply tell jurors not to be biased or to
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suppress any stereotypes they may endorse about the mentally ill or those who plead insanity. In fact,
doing so is likely to activate a “rebound effect” that may actually increase bias. One technique that has
worked in bias reduction is asking individuals to engage in perspective taking exercises, such exercises
involve imagining themselves in the other person’s shoes (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000).
Literature on the effect of emotions on judgment and decision-making suggests that in order to
reduce intuitive reasoning that potentially leads to biased judgments (especially in emotionally charged
cases) individuals need a sufficient amount of time and cognitive resources in order to carefully and
comprehensively process case facts. Thus, in the case of judges, it might be useful for the judge to take
more time preparing for cases involving the insanity defense or to take more time going over the facts of
a case before rendering a decision.
Another potential strategy involves feedback. Research suggests that when individuals receive
information that others are not biased in some regard they are more likely to work on addressing their
biased attitude and behaviors (Casey, Warren, Cheesman, and Elek, 2012; Kang, Bennett, Carbado,
Casey, Dasgupta, Faigman, Godsil, Greenwald, Levinson, & Mnookin, 2012). Feedback is most effective
when: 1) the source is perceived as legitimate and respected; 2) it focuses on the decision-making
process as opposed to the decision itself and; 3) when the feedback is offered before an individual
comes to a decision (Plant & Devine, 2001). Once an individual makes up their mind it is harder to get
him or her to change it (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). It is also important that the feedback does not make
the individual feel forced or pressured to change their views. Otherwise, feedback may have the
opposite effect and cause the individual to think and act in more biased ways.
Future Research. Considering the current findings, potential implications of the results, and
potential remedies for insanity defense bias there are many avenues that future research on this topic
should/can take. Examining the relationship between anger and punitive judgments within an NGRI
group, given one particular set of case facts, might allow researchers to explore differences between
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participants who significantly differ with regard to their emotional response and punitive judgments in
NGRI cases. Also, if case facts were delivered to participants in a medium designed to elicit the
emotional response that would be generated from a real trial, anger might be more salient, and
therefore, have a stronger influence on outcomes. The studies in this paper looked at the effect of plea
on anger and punitive judgments but it would be interesting to see if participants anger levels changed
after receiving information about plea. In other words, one could design a study in which participants
would be randomly assigned to one of three groups. The participants would all be presented with the
same case facts in which the defendant pleads NGRI. Emotional arousal and punitive judgments would
be measured. Then participants would receive information about verdict (Guilty, Not Guilty, or NGRI).
Then emotional arousal and punitive judgments would be measured again. This would allow one to test
the way in which punishment dissipates/affects emotional arousal.
It is also clear that the potential role of other relevant emotions needs to be explored. It seems
likely that, at a minimum, disgust and fear could be influencing people’s responses. Preliminary,
exploratory, MANOVA analyses conducted during this study indicated that contempt and fear
(independently and when interacting with each other and plea) significantly affected anger. Disgust,
independently and when interacting with contempt or fear also significantly affected anger. Preliminary
exploratory data also indicated that contempt significantly effects punitive judgment when controlling
for condition. The data also showed a significant interaction effect for contempt and disgust on punitive
judgment. Thus, the nature of the relationship between plea and multiple negative emotions (i.e., anger,
disgust, fear, and contempt) needs to be further explored in order to tease apart how the
aforementioned cluster of negative emotions work together and independently to impact punitive
judgment.
In the current studies, participant’s reaction to the defendant’s actions and plea were measured
with a series of items addressing punitive judgment. Additional work is needed to develop a scale with
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necessary validation steps to improve the ability to measure punitive judgment. Finally, efforts to
minimize the effects of bias toward the insanity plea need to be tested and developed so that
meaningful bias reduction can be accomplished.
Study Two
Hypothesis, Major Findings, Interpretation. Study Two had three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1
stated that: Increased norm violation/perceived responsibility leads to an increase in punitive judgments
(with medication non-compliance>prior history>standard). Hypothesis 2 stated that: Increased norm
violation/perceived responsibility leads to increased anger (with medication non-compliance>prior
history>standard). Hypothesis 3 stated that: Increases in anger lead to increases in punitive judgments.
The data from the study supports Hypothesis 2 but did not support Hypothesis 1 and only
supports Hypothesis 3 in part. The results of the study showed that changing/increasing responsibility
case facts increased level of anger (Hypothesis 2) and that anger scores could predict verdict selection to
a statistically significant degree (Hypothesis 3).
Previous Research. The results of the study showed that when case facts increased
responsibility on the defendant’s part, potential jurors experienced an increase in anger. Participants in
the medication non-compliance group felt more anger, after reading the vignettes, than participants in
the prior history group, as measured by state anger and EAQ anger.
This is consistent with the psychological literature on anger, when an individual is seen as being
responsible for their actions they are more likely to elicit anger from an observer. Furthermore, if an
event that triggers anger is seen as a breach of standards and norms then this will lead to a strong
degree of anger and potentially lead to aggressive behavior. This has been shown to occur because the
angry individual has come to the conclusion that something did occur, or could occur, that should not. In
addition, the likelihood and degree of anger are greater if events are also appraised as: (a) intentional,
(b) preventable or controllable, (c) unwarranted, and (d) blameworthy (Deffenbacher, 2011). The
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aforementioned appraisals then lead to a desire to enact retribution. According to Vidmar’s (2001, pp.
292-293) retribution model: “(1) there is a perceived rule or norm violation; (2) the rule violator’s
intention is perceived as blameworthy; (3) the combination of (1) and (2) threatens or actually harms
values related to the perceiver’s personal self, status, or internalized group values; (4) the emotion of
anger is aroused; (5) the cognitions and emotions foster reactions against the violator; (6) during or
following punishment the anger dissipates, cognitions return toward homeostasis, and the rule or norm
is perceived to be vindicated.”
A defendant not complying with medication would seemingly make the defendant seem more
responsible and thus this information would elicit anger from participants. In addition, it is easy to see
how the defendant’s lack of medication compliance would be perceived as intentional, preventable or
controllable, unwarranted, and/or blameworthy. So, the defendant has engaged in behavior that is seen
as a norm violation and as blameworthy. The combination offends the values of the participant, leads to
anger, and then leads to a desire to render more punitive judgments.
Alternative Explanations of the Findings. Like Study One, the results of Study Two potentially
suggest that other emotions such as contempt, disgust, and fear might need to be investigated in order
to fully conceptualize the relationship between plea, emotion, and punitive judgments. As previous
research suggests, it is likely that anger alone cannot account for punitive judgments. This could explain
why anger scores did not impact degree of punitive judgments.
Limitations. Although the current data and previous research support Hypothesis 2, the data did
not support Hypothesis 1 and only supported Hypothesis 3 in part (nor was a mediational relationship
established). A number of methodological limitations could have affected the findings. As in Study One,
Study Two was vulnerable to the limitations associated with online studies in general and the use of
Mturk in particular. In addition, similarly to Study One, the use of vignettes in the study may not have
elicited a strong enough emotional response. Finally, it is possible that the case facts that were
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manipulated in order to increase responsibility were not perceived by participants as characterizing
more or less responsibility. Thus, the non-compliance and prior history conditions made the defendant
appear more responsible than the standard condition. However, non-compliance and prior history (at
least as presented in this particular study) may have evoked the same (or similar) perceptions of
responsibility. As a result, significant differences would not be detected overall with regard to the
impact of condition on punitive judgments or on anger.
Future Research. According to Vidmar’s (2001) retribution model, when individuals perceive
another’s act as a rule or norm violation the rule violator’s intention is perceived as blameworthy.
Furthermore, the perceiving individual’s values, related to self, status, or the group, are threatened or
harmed. This results in feelings of anger which results in further emotions and cognitions that foster
punitive reactions toward the violator.
The insanity defense literature suggests that certain variables/case facts can trigger perceptions
of norm violation and feed into the insanity myths identified by Perlin. For example, insanity defense
research already indicates that case facts related to planfulness and medication compliance can affect
attributions of blame and punishment in insanity cases (Robert & Golding, 1991; Whittmore & Ogloff,
1995). Thus, some future avenues of research could involve manipulating other responsibility case facts
(along with planfulness and medication non-compliance) to see not only what other kinds of facts
impact punitive judgments and anger but to also explore whether research can tease apart more clearly
if there are certain facts/violation that are worse than others.
General Conclusion
Overall, the data from both studies suggest that at least in some ways the law is not “reason
free from passion.” Potential jurors considered a plea and verdict of NGRI to be less fair than a plea and
verdict of self-defense. The data also suggested that level of anger affected the degree to which a
defendant was perceived as blameworthy, punishment worthy, reckless and potentially reckless in the
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future. Additionally, level of anger also affected the degree to which a defendant’s actions were seen as
controllable and preventable (controllability). This suggests that when the insanity defense is involved,
the defendant may not be able to obtain his 6th amendment right to a fair trial. Given the goals of the
legal system it is important to further explore the role of emotions in insanity defense bias and to
further study effective bias reduction tools and strategies.
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Appendix A: Figures
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Appendix B: Study One Vignettes
Case Description (NGRI Condition)
The defendant has been charged with second degree murder and has entered a plea of NOT GUILTY BY
REASON OF INSANITY.
The victim, age 30, often walked to the grocery store across the street from his apartment building. One
evening, he went to the store but had not returned after several hours. One of his friends, decided to go
to the store himself to check if he was still there. Not finding him, he returned to the victim’s apartment
and called the police, who found the victim’s body behind the store. The medical examiner confirmed
that the victim had died as a result of being stabbed twice in the back. A knife found at the scene was
confirmed to be the murder weapon. On the knife the police found fingerprints which matched those of
the defendant, who was picked up a block away from the store. The police decided to fingerprint him
after the store clerk stated that the defendant had left the area shortly after the victim did. Upon further
inspection, the police noticed that defendant had blood on his hands. Additionally, two eyewitnesses
stated that they saw the defendant wandering in the store’s parking lot and then leave abruptly just
after the victim left the store.
The defendant stated that he had felt threatened by the victim. The convenience store clerk testified
that he had actually hired the defendant to clean the store’s parking lot but had changed his mind when
the defendant had started harassing customers. The defendant’s uncle testified that the defendant had
been staying with him for the past two weeks since moving to town. The defendant’s uncle also stated
that the defendant had confided in him that he thought a particular store customer was out to get him
and that the defendant felt that he might need to protect himself if he ran into the customer again.
Case Description (Self-Defense Condition)
The defendant has been charged with second degree murder and has entered a plea of NOT GUILTY BY
REASON OF SELF-DEFENSE.
The victim, age 30, often walked to the grocery store across the street from his apartment building. One
evening, he went to the store but had not returned after several hours. One of his friends, decided to go
to the store himself to check if he was still there. Not finding him, he returned to the victim’s apartment
and called the police, who found the victim’s body behind the store. The medical examiner confirmed
that the victim had died as a result of being stabbed twice in the back. A knife found at the scene was
confirmed to be the murder weapon. On the knife the police found fingerprints which matched those of
the defendant, who was picked up a block away from the store. The police decided to fingerprint him
after the store clerk stated that the defendant had left the area shortly after the victim did. Upon further
inspection, the police noticed that defendant had blood on his hands. Additionally, two eyewitnesses
stated that they saw the defendant wandering in the store’s parking lot and then leave abruptly just
after the victim left the store.
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The defendant stated that he had felt threatened by the victim. The convenience store clerk testified
that he had actually hired the defendant to clean the store’s parking lot but had changed his mind when
the defendant had started harassing customers. The defendant’s uncle testified that the defendant had
been staying with him for the past two weeks since moving to town. The defendant’s uncle also stated
that the defendant had confided in him that he thought a particular store customer was out to get him
and that the defendant felt that he might need to protect himself if he ran into the customer again.
Case Description (No Plea Information Given Condition)
The defendant has been charged with second degree murder.
The victim, age 30, often walked to the grocery store across the street from his apartment building. One
evening, he went to the store but had not returned after several hours. One of his friends, decided to go
to the store himself to check if he was still there. Not finding him, he returned to the victim’s apartment
and called the police, who found the victim’s body behind the store. The medical examiner confirmed
that the victim had died as a result of being stabbed twice in the back. A knife found at the scene was
confirmed to be the murder weapon. On the knife the police found fingerprints which matched those of
the defendant, who was picked up a block away from the store. The police decided to fingerprint him
after the store clerk stated that the defendant had left the area shortly after the victim did. Upon further
inspection, the police noticed that defendant had blood on his hands. Additionally, two eyewitnesses
stated that they saw the defendant wandering in the store’s parking lot and then leave abruptly just
after the victim left the store.
The defendant stated that he had felt threatened by the victim. The convenience store clerk testified
that he had actually hired the defendant to clean the store’s parking lot but had changed his mind when
the defendant had started harassing customers. The defendant’s uncle testified that the defendant had
been staying with him for the past two weeks since moving to town. The defendant’s uncle also stated
that the defendant had confided in him that he thought a particular store customer was out to get him
and that the defendant felt that he might need to protect himself if he ran into the customer again.
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Appendix C: Demographic Questionnaire
1. My gender is:
__Male __Female
2. I am ________ years old.
3. I consider myself to be:
__ African American __ Native American __ Asian
__ Pacific Islander __ Biracial __ Caucasian
__ Hispanic __ Other (Specify___________)
4. Are you a citizen of the United States?
YES_____ or NO______
5. Are you currently subject to felony charges?
YES_____ or NO______
6. Have you ever been convicted of a felony charge?
YES_____ or NO______
7. To what degree do you believe in free-will?
Not at all--------1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------Extremely
8. On a scale of 1-9, how do you feel about the plea of self-defense (with 1 being the most negative and
9 being the most positive).
Negatively--------1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------Positively
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Appendix D: Manipulation Check Questionnaire
Case Description (1.1)
What was the defendant’s plea?
a) Guilty
b) Not Guilty
c) Guilty by Reason of Insanity
d) Self-Defense
Was the victim stabbed twice in the back?
a) Yes
b) No
Was the defendant ever hospitalized for mental health issues?
a) Yes
b) No
Case Description (1.2)
What was the defendant’s plea?
a) Guilty
b) Not Guilty
c) Guilty by Reason of Insanity
d) Self-Defense
Was the victim stabbed twice in the back?
a) Yes
b) No
Case Description (1.3)
What was the defendant’s plea?
a) Guilty
b) Not Guilty
c) Guilty by Reason of Insanity
d) Self-Defense
Was the victim stabbed twice in the back?
a) Yes
b) No
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Case Description (2.1)
What was the defendant’s plea?
a) Guilty
b) Not Guilty
c) Guilty by Reason of Insanity
d) Self-Defense
Was the victim stabbed twice in the back?
a) Yes
b) No
Was the defendant ever hospitalized for mental health issues?
a) Yes
b) No
Case Description (2.2)
What was the defendant’s plea?
a) Guilty
b) Not Guilty
c) Guilty by Reason of Insanity
d) Self-Defense
Was the victim stabbed twice in the back?
a) Yes
b) No
Was the defendant ever hospitalized for mental health issues?
a) Yes
b) No
Once released from the hospital did the defendant take medication prescribed to him?
a) Yes
b) No
Case Description (2.3)
What was the defendant’s plea?
a) Guilty
b) Not Guilty
c) Guilty by Reason of Insanity
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d) Self-Defense
Was the victim stabbed twice in the back?
a) Yes
b) No
Was the defendant ever hospitalized for mental health issues?
a) Yes
b) No
Did the defendant have a prior history with the victim?
a) Yes
b) No

85

Appendix E: State-Trait Anger Scale
Please report the intensity of your feelings right now:
1
2
Not at all
Somewhat

3
Moderately

4
Very much so

3
Often

4
Almost always

I feel angry
I am furious
I feel irritated
I am mad
I am burned up
I feel like hitting someone
I feel like breaking things
I feel like banging on the table
I feel like yelling at somebody
I feel like swearing
Please rate how you generally feel:
1
2
Almost never
Sometimes

I have a fiery temper
I am quick-tempered
I am a hotheaded person
I fly off the handle
I feel infuriated when I do a good job and get a poor evaluation
It makes me furious when I am criticized in front of others
I feel annoyed when I am not given recognition for doing good work
I get angry when I’m slowed down by others mistakes
When I get mad, I say nasty things
When I get frustrated, I feel like hitting someone
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Appendix F: Emotional Arousal Scale
Circle the number on the scale that best describes the greatest amount of each emotion you felt as a
direct result of the plea entered by the defendant. On this scale, 0 means you did not feel even the
slightest bit of the emotion and 8 is the most you have ever felt in your life:
Amusement
Did not feel even
the slightest bit

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

Anger
Did not feel even
the slightest bit

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

Arousal
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
Confusion
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
Contempt
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
Contentment
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
Disgust
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
Embarrassment
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
Fear
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
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Happiness
Did not feel even
the slightest bit

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

Surprise
Did not feel even
the slightest bit

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

Tension
Did not feel even
the slightest bit

----0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8----

Most you have
felt in your life

Interest
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
Pain
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
Relief
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
Sadness
Did not feel even
the slightest bit
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Appendix G: Punitive Judgment Instrument
Please circle the number that best represents your opinion:
Not at all--------1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------Extremely
How intentional were the defendant's actions?
How preventable were the defendant’s actions?
How controllable were the defendant’s actions?
How fair would entering a PLEA of (Insert Plea) be?
How fair would a VERDICT of (Insert Verdict) be?
To what extent should the defendant be blamed?
To what extent should the defendant be punished?
How reckless did the defendant seem to be?
How reckless might the defendant be in future situations?
What verdict would you choose to give the defendant (Pick One):
Not Guilty By (Insert Plea), Guilty, or Not Guilty
How certain are you (on a 1-9 scale) that this is the appropriate verdict?
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Appendix H: Insanity Defense Attitudes Scale – Revised
Instructions: On the following pages, you will find statements that express commonly held opinions
about the insanity defense. We would like to know how much you agree or disagree with each of these
statements. Indicate your level of agreement with each of the following items by pairing each item with
a number based on this scale:

1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Neutral

5
Slightly
Agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
Agree

____ I believe that people should be held responsible for their actions no matter what their mental
condition.
____ I believe that all human beings know what they are doing and have the power to control
themselves.
____ The insanity defense threatens public safety by telling criminals that they can get away with a
crime if they come up with a good story about why they did it.
____ I believe that mental illness can impair people’s ability to make logical choices and control
themselves. R
____ A defendant’s degree of insanity is irrelevant: if he commits the crime, then he should do the time.
____ The insanity defense returns disturbed, dangerous people to the streets.
____ Mentally ill defendants who plead insanity have failed to exert enough willpower to behave
properly like the rest of us. So, they should be punished for their crimes like everyone else.
____ As a last resort, defense attorneys will encourage their clients to act strangely and lie through their
teeth in order to appear “insane.”
____ Perfectly sane killers can get away with their crimes by hiring high-priced lawyers and experts who
misuse the insanity defense.
____ The insanity plea is a loophole in the law that allows too many guilty people to escape punishment.
____ We should punish people who commit criminal acts, regardless of their degree of mental
disturbance.
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____ It is wrong to punish people who commit crime for crazy reasons while gripped by uncontrollable
hallucinations or delusions. R
____ Most defendants who use the insanity defense are truly mentally ill, not fakers. R
____ Some people with severe mental illness are out of touch with reality and do not understand that
their acts are wrong. These people cannot be blamed and do not deserve to be punished. R
____ Many of the crazy criminals that psychiatrists see fit to return to the streets go on to kill again.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree
Slightly
Neutral
Slightly
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree

____ With slick attorneys and a sad story, any criminal can use the insanity defense to finagle his way to
freedom.
____ It is wrong to punish someone for an act they commit because of any uncontrollable illness,
whether it be epilepsy or mental illness. R
____ I believe that we should punish a person for a criminal act only if he understood the act as evil and
then freely chose to do it. R
____ For the right price, psychiatrists will probably manufacture a “mental illness” for any criminal to
convince the jury that he is insane.
Instructions: Please place a check mark over the corresponding number.
21. How strongly do you feel about the insanity defense?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Strongly

6

7

Very
Important

22. How personally important is your opinion on the insanity defense?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

23. How much do you care about the insanity defense?
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5

Not at all

1

2

3

4
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5

6

7

Very
Much

Appendix I: Self-Defense Attitudes Scale
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Disagree
Slightly
Neutral
Slightly
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree
The plea of self-defense should be abolished.
The plea of self-defense is mainly a rich person’s defense.
As a juror, I would never vote for a self-defense plea regardless of the facts and circumstances of the
case.
In general, I am opposed to the plea of self-defense.
The plea of self-defense is a loophole that allows too many guilty people to go free.
As a juror, I could not vote for the plea of self-defense, even if the law allowed me to.
I am opposed to a plea of self-defense under any circumstances.
People should be held responsible for their actions no matter what their reason (i.e. self-defense).
A lot of people commit crimes and “get away with it” by using a plea of self-defense.
The plea of self-defense allows dangerous criminals to escape responsibility by not sending them to
prison.
With slick attorneys and a sad story, any criminal can use a plea of self-defense to manipulate their way
to freedom.
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Appendix J: Study Two Vignettes
Case Description (Medication Non-Compliance Condition)
The defendant has been charged with second degree murder and has entered a plea of NOT GUILTY BY
REASON OF INSANITY.
The victim, age 30, often walked to the grocery store across the street from his apartment building. One
evening, he went to the store but had not returned after several hours. One of his friends, decided to go
to the store himself to check if he was still there. Not finding him, he returned to the victim’s apartment
and called the police, who found the victim’s body behind the store. The medical examiner confirmed
that the victim had died as a result of being stabbed twice in the back. A knife found at the scene was
confirmed to be the murder weapon. On the knife the police found fingerprints which matched those of
the defendant, who was picked up a block away from the store. The police decided to fingerprint him
after the store clerk stated that the defendant had left the area shortly after the victim did. Upon further
inspection, the police noticed that defendant had blood on his hands. Additionally, two eyewitnesses
stated that they saw the defendant wandering in the store’s parking lot and then leave abruptly just
after the victim left the store.
The convenience store clerk testified that he had actually hired the defendant to clean the store’s
parking lot but had changed his mind when the defendant had started harassing customers. The
defendant’s uncle testified that the defendant had been staying with him for the past two weeks since
moving to town. The defendant’s uncle also stated that the defendant had confided in him that he
thought people were out to get him and that he often felt the need to protect himself. The uncle was
not aware that for the past several years, the defendant had been in and out of mental hospitals where
he was treated for various mental illnesses.
His medical records confirmed several hospital admissions where the defendant was given medication
for his condition. The medication improved his condition while in the hospital but once released his
problems seemed too much for him to control, even while he was medicated.
Case Description (Control Condition)
The defendant has been charged with second degree murder and has entered a plea of NOT GUILTY BY
REASON OF INSANITY.
The victim, age 30, often walked to the grocery store across the street from his apartment building. One
evening, he went to the store but had not returned after several hours. One of his friends, decided to go
to the store himself to check if he was still there. Not finding him, he returned to the victim’s apartment
and called the police, who found the victim’s body behind the store. The medical examiner confirmed
that the victim had died as a result of being stabbed twice in the back. A knife found at the scene was
confirmed to be the murder weapon. On the knife the police found fingerprints which matched those of
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the defendant, who was picked up a block away from the store. The police decided to fingerprint him
after the store clerk stated that the defendant had left the area shortly after the victim did. Upon further
inspection, the police noticed that defendant had blood on his hands. Additionally, two eyewitnesses
stated that they saw the defendant wandering in the store’s parking lot and then leave abruptly just
after the victim left the store.
The convenience store clerk testified that he had actually hired the defendant to clean the store’s
parking lot but had changed his mind when the defendant had started harassing customers. The
defendant’s uncle testified that the defendant had been staying with him for the past two weeks since
moving to town. The defendant’s uncle also stated that the defendant had confided in him that he
thought people were out to get him and that he often felt the need to protect himself. The uncle was
not aware that for the past several years, the defendant had been in and out of mental hospitals where
he was treated for various mental illnesses.
His medical records confirmed several hospital admissions where the defendant was given medication
for his condition. The medication improved his condition while in the hospital but once released his
problems seemed too much for him to control. Records indicate this was often due to his refusal to take
his medication once released from the hospital. Medical reports indicate that in the weeks leading up to
the victim’s death the defendant had not been taking the medication prescribed to him.
Case Description (Prior History Condition)
The defendant has been charged with second degree murder and has entered a plea of NOT GUILTY BY
REASON OF INSANITY.
The victim, age 30, often walked to the grocery store across the street from his apartment building. One
evening, he went to the store but had not returned after several hours. One of his friends, decided to go
to the store himself to check if he was still there. Not finding him, he returned to the victim’s apartment
and called the police, who found the victim’s body behind the store. The medical examiner confirmed
that the victim had died as a result of being stabbed twice in the back. A knife found at the scene was
confirmed to be the murder weapon. On the knife the police found fingerprints which matched those of
the defendant, who was picked up a block away from the store. The police decided to fingerprint him
after the store clerk stated that the defendant had left the area shortly after the victim did. Upon further
inspection, the police noticed that defendant had blood on his hands. Additionally, two eyewitnesses
stated that they saw the defendant wandering in the store’s parking lot and then leave abruptly just
after the victim left the store.
The convenience store clerk testified that he had actually hired the defendant to clean the store’s
parking lot but had changed his mind when the defendant had started harassing customers.
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In fact, the victim was one of the customers the clerk had seen the defendant harassing on more than
one occasion. The clerk recalled that the victim and defendant had heated exchanges on numerous
occasions.
The defendant’s uncle testified that the defendant had been staying with him for the past two weeks
since moving to town. The defendant’s uncle also stated that the defendant had confided in him that he
thought people were out to get him and that he often felt the need to protect himself. The uncle was
not aware that for the past several years, the defendant had been in and out of mental hospitals where
he was treated for various mental illnesses. His medical records confirmed several hospital admissions
where Green was given medication for his condition.
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Appendix K: Tables
Study One
Table 1
Factor Loadings from Principle
Component Factor Analysis

Intentional
Preventable
Controllable
Blameworthiness
Punishment
Worthiness
Recklessness
Future Recklessness

Component
1
2
.56
.25
.017
.91
-.003
.92
.82
.063
.93 -.084
.90
.91

-.001
-.064

Table 2
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Cronbach's Standardized
Alpha
Items
N of Items
.88
.89
7
Table 3
Multivariate Tests

Effect
IDAS-R
Trait Anger
Freewill
Condition

Wilks' Lambda
Wilks' Lambda
Wilks' Lambda
Wilks' Lambda

Value
.91
.98
.97
.98

F
17.5
4.23
6.37
2.40
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Hypothesis df Error df
2.00
372
2.00
372
2.00
372
4.00
744

Partial Eta
Sig.
Squared
p < .001
.086
.015
.022
.002
.033
.049
.013

Table 4
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source
IDAS-R

Trait Anger

Freewill

Condition

Error

Dependent
Variable
Punishment
Worthiness
Controllability
Punishment
Worthiness
Controllability
Punishment
Worthiness
Controllability
Punishment
Worthiness
Controllability
Punishment
Worthiness
Controllability

Type III Sum of
Squares
df Mean Square
1701
1
1701

F

Partial Eta
Sig.
Squared
34.5 p < .001
.085

160
277

1
1

160
277

12.2
5.63

.001
.018

.032
.015

1.49
222

1
1

1.49
222

.11
4.52

.74
.034

.000
.012

164
367

1
2

164
183

12.5 p < .001
3.72
.025

.033
.020

.019
18385

2
373

.009
49.3

.001

.000

4894

373

13.1

.999

Table 5
Pairwise Comparisons

Dependent
Variable
Punishment
Worthiness

95% Confidence Interval
Mean
for Differencea
Difference (Ia
(I) Condition (J) Condition
J)
Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
NGRI
No Info
-.117
.88 1.00
-2.23
2.00
Self Defense
2.05
.90 .070
-.12
4.22
No Info
NGRI
.117
.88 1.00
-2.00
2.24
Self Defense
2.17
.88 .043
.047
4.29
Self Defense NGRI
-2.05
.90 .070
-4.22
.12
No Info
2.17
.88 .043
-4.29
-.047
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Table 6
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

Plea
Fairness
Verdict
Fairness

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
assumed

F
6.22

Sig.
.013

t
-3.95

8.97

.003

-3.31

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Mean Std. Error Interval of the
Difference
Sig. (2- Differenc Differenc
df tailed)
e
e
Lower Upper
244 .000
-1.05
.27
-1.58
-.53

244

.001

-.80

.24

-1.27

-.32

Table 7
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

Verdict
Equal
Certainty variances
assumed

F
.005

Sig.
.94

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Mean Std. Error Interval of the
Difference
Sig. (2- Differenc Differenc
t
df tailed)
e
e
Lower Upper
1.99 244 .048
.50
.25
.005
.99

Table 8
Chi-Square Tests
Value

df

Pearson Chi-Square

3.07

N of Valid Cases

246
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Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
2

.22

Table 9
Multivariate Tests

Effect
IDAS-R
Age
Trait Anger
Condition

Value
.98
.98
.87
.98

Wilks' Lambda
Wilks' Lambda
Wilks' Lambda
Wilks' Lambda

F
3.59
3.26
27.10
1.54

Hypothesis df Error df
Sig.
2
372 .029
2
372 .039
2
372 .000
4
744
.19

Partial Eta
Squared
.019
.017
.13
.008

Table 10
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source
IDAS-R
Age
Trait Anger
Condition
Error

Dependent
Variable
State Anger
EAQ Anger
State Anger
EAQ Anger
State Anger
EAQ Anger
State Anger
Anger
State Anger
EAQ Anger

Type III Sum of
Squares
12.1
20.6
106
15.5
1113
97.0
79.1
16.7
8969
1120

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
373
373

Mean Square
12.1
20.6
106
15.4
1113
97.0
39.5
8.4
24.1
3.00

F
.50
6.86
4.45
5.13
46.3
32.3
1.65
2.78

Sig.
.48
.009
.036
.024
.000
.000
.19
.063

Partial Eta
Squared
.001
.018
.012
.014
.11
.080
.009
.015

Table 11
Regression Analysis for Anger Predicting Punishment Worthiness

Model
1
(Constant)
State Anger
Anger

Unstandardized
Standardized
95.0% Confidence Interval
Coefficients
Coefficients
for B
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
36.647
1.033
35.468 .000
34.615
38.678
-.078
.087
-.055
-.903 .367
-.248
.092
.142
.246
.035
.576 .565
-.342
.626
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Table 12
Regression Analysis for Anger Predicting Controllability

Model
1
(Constant)
State Anger
Anger

Unstandardized
Standardized
95.0% Confidence Interval
Coefficients
Coefficients
for B
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
14.182
.515
27.514 .000
13.169
15.196
-.013
.043
-.018
-.290 .772
-.097
.072
-.032
.123
-.016
-.264 .792
-.274
.209
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Study Two
Table 13
Factor Loadings from Principle
Component Factor Analysis
Component
1
2
.571
.262
-.043
.871
.123
.812
.711
.184
.690
.235

Intentional
Preventable
Controllable
Blameworthiness
Punishment
Worthiness
Recklessness
.882
Future Recklessness .889

-.095
-.177

Table 14
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Cronbach's Standardized
Alpha
Items
N of Items
.847
.852
7
Table 15
Multivariate Tests

Effect
IDAS-R
Condition

Wilks' Lambda
Wilks' Lambda

Value
.58
.98

F
Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
55.928
5.000 380.000 .000
55.928
10.000 760.000
.64
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Partial Eta
Squared
.424
.010

Table 16
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent
Type III Sum of
Source
Variable
Squares
df Mean Square
IDAS-R
Punishment
5607.238
1
5607.238
Worthiness
Controllability
902.448
1
902.448
Plea Fairness
560.299
1
560.299
Verdict Fairness
551.611
1
551.611
Verdict Certainty
152.443
1
152.443
Condition
Punishment
12.623
2
6.312
Worthiness
Controllability
17.790
2
8.895
Plea Fairness
2.629
2
1.314
Verdict Fairness
20.606
2
10.303
Verdict Certainty
.809
2
.404
Error
Punishment
16056.921 384
41.815
Worthiness
Controllability
4770.860 384
12.424
Plea Fairness
1692.527 384
4.408
Verdict Fairness
1580.960 384
4.117
Verdict Certainty
1347.371 384
3.509

Partial Eta
F
Sig.
Squared
134.097 .000
.259
72.637
127.120
133.981
43.446
.151

.000
.000
.000
.000
.860

.159
.249
.259
.102
.001

.716
.298
2.503
.115

.489
.742
.083
.891

.004
.002
.013
.001

Table 17
Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi8.862
Square
N of Valid Cases 388

df
4

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)
.07

Table 18
Multivariate Tests

Effect
IDAS-R
Trait Anger
Condition

Wilks' Lambda
Wilks' Lambda
Wilks' Lambda

Value
.94
.89
.97

Partial Eta
F
Hypothesis df Error df
Sig.
Squared
12.8a
2
377 p < .001
.064
23.5
2
377 p < .001
.11
3.39
4
754
.009
.018
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Table 19
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source
IDAS-R
Trait Anger
Condition
Error

Dependent
Variable
State Anger
Anger
State Anger
Anger
State Anger
Anger
State Anger
Anger

Type III Sum of
Squares
290
72.2
849
61.2
229
24.1
6912
1181

df
1
1
1
1
2
2
378
378

Mean Square
290
72.2
849.
61.2
114
12.1
18.3
3.13

F
15.9
23.1
46.4
19.6
6.28
3.86

Partial Eta
Sig.
Squared
p < .001
.040
p < .001
.058
p < .001
.11
p < .001
.049
.002
.032
.022
.020

Table 20
Pairwise Comparisons
95% Confidence Interval
Mean
for Differencea
Difference (I(J) Condition
J)
Std. Error Sig.a Lower Bound Upper Bound
NGRI Med Non
-1.17
.53 .084
-2.45
.11
Compliance
NGRI Prior
.69
.55
.62
-.63
2.01
History
NGRI Med Non NGRI Control
1.17
.53 .084
-.11
2.45
Compliance
NGRI Prior
1.86
.53 .002
.58
3.15
History
NGRI Prior
NGRI Control
-.69
.55
.62
-2.01
.63
History
NGRI Med Non
1.86
.53 .002
-3.15
-.58
Compliance
EAQ Anger NGRI Control NGRI Med Non
-.45
.22
.12
-.98
.078
Compliance
NGRI Prior
.13
.23 1.00
-.42
.67
History
NGRI Med Non NGRI Control
.45
.22
.12
-.078
.98
Compliance
NGRI Prior
.58
.22 .027
.048
1.11
History
NGRI Prior
NGRI Control
-.13
.23 1.00
-.67
.42
History
NGRI MedNonC
-.58
.22 .027
-1.11
-.048
Dependent
Variable
(I) Condition
State Anger NGRI Control
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Table 21
Regression Analysis for Anger Predicting Punishment Worthiness
Unstandardized
Standardized
95.0% Confidence Interval
Coefficients
Coefficients
for B
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1
(Constant)
34.578
1.124
30.8 .000
32.4
36.8
State Anger
-.27
.10
-.17
-2.64 .009
-.46
-.07
Anger
1.07
.25
.27
4.25 .000
.57
1.56
Table 22
Regression Analysis for Anger Predicting Controllability
Unstandardized
Standardized
95.0% Confidence Interval
Coefficients
Coefficients
for B
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1
(Constant)
12.844
.59
21.959 .000
11.69
13.99
State Anger
-.083
.052
-.103 -1.593 .11
-.19
.020
Anger
.333
.131
.165 2.547 .011
.08
.590
Table 23
Regression Analysis for Anger Predicting Plea Fairness
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
1
(Constant)
5.23
.37
State Anger
-.032
.033
-.063
Anger
.039
.083
.030

95.0% Confidence Interval
for B
t
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
14.093 .000
4.50
5.96
-.966 .34
-.097
.033
.466 .64
-.12
.20

Table 24
Regression Analysis For Anger Predicting Verdict Fairness
Unstandardized
Standardized
95.0% Confidence Interval
Coefficients
Coefficients
for B
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1
(Constant)
4.003
.363
11.020 .000
3.29
4.72
State Anger
.024
.033
.048
.728 .47
-.040
.088
Anger
-.036
.081
-.029
-.438 .66
-.20
.12
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Table 25
Regression Analysis for Anger Predicting Verdict Certainty
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
1
(Constant)
6.550
.300
State Anger
-.027
.027
-.064
Anger
.15
.067
.15
Table 26
Discriminant Analysis Wilks' Lambda
Test of
Function(s) Wilks' Lambda Chi-square
df
Sig.
1 through 2
.958
16.4
4 .003
2
1.000
.026
1
.87
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95.0% Confidence Interval
for B
t
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
21.81 .000
5.96
7.14
-.99 .33
-.079
.03
2.30 .022
.022
.29
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